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ABSTRACT
The 1964 Securities Acts Amendments extended the mandatory disclosure requirements that had
applied to listed firms since 1934 to large firms traded Over-the-Counter (OTC).  We find several
pieces of evidence indicating that investors valued these disclosure requirements, two of which are
particularly striking.  First, a firm-level event study reveals that OTC firms most impacted by the
1964 Amendments had abnormal excess returns of about 3.5 percent in the weeks immediately
surrounding the announcement that they had begun to comply with the new requirements.  Second,
we estimate that the most affected OTC firms had abnormal excess returns ranging between 11.5 and
22.1 percent in the period between when the legislation was initially proposed and when it went into
force, relative to unaffected listed firms and after adjustment for the standard four-factor model.
While we cannot determine how much of shareholders’ gains were a transfer from insiders of these
same companies, our results suggest that mandatory disclosure causes managers to more narrowly
focus on the maximization of shareholder value.
Michael Greenstone





















Since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
federal government has actively regulated U.S. equity markets. The centerpiece of these eﬀorts is
the mandated disclosure of ﬁnancial information. Proponents of securities market regulations cite
cross-country studies that ﬁnd that higher levels of investor protection, such as mandatory disclosure
requirements, are associated with less concentrated ownership, larger equity markets, and higher
valuations of equities (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer [1999], La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny [1997, 2002]). Although cross-country studies are likely to confound numerous
eﬀects, these empirical ﬁndings suggest that mandatory disclosure laws may provide access to
equity on more favorable terms for entrepreneurs. Furthermore, given the link between ﬁnancial
development and growth (Rajan and Zingales [1998] and Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald [2004]),
these laws may lead to higher standards of living.
Previous research that is narrowly focused on mandatory disclosure laws, however, provides
mixed evidence on their impacts. Theoretical models suggest that these laws can be beneﬁcial
when the costs of writing or enforcing contracts that bind managers to maximize shareholder value
are suﬃciently high. Although the ﬁrst empirical evaluations of mandatory disclosure laws were
published four decades ago (Stigler [1964], Friend and Herman [1964], Robbins and Werner [1964],
and Benston [1973]), the extensive subsequent literature has failed to reach a consensus (Coﬀee
[1984], Healy and Palepu [2001]). The absence of convincing evidence has led some legal scholars
to recommend signiﬁcant modiﬁcation or repeal of the statutes that regulate U.S. securities mar-
kets, including the mandatory disclosure requirements (Mahoney [1997], Romano [1998], Palmiter
[1999]).
This paper presents new evidence on the impacts of mandatory disclosure laws by analyzing
the eﬀect of the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments on stock returns and operating performance
of ﬁrms newly aﬀected by this legislation. The 1964 Amendments are the last major mandatory
disclosure regulations applied to U.S. equity markets. They extended the disclosure requirements
that have applied to ﬁrms traded on exchanges (e.g., the New York and American Stock Exchanges,
henceforth NYSE and AMEX) since 1934 to ﬁrms traded Over-the-Counter (OTC) that exceeded
asset and shareholder ﬂoors. Speciﬁcally, covered OTC ﬁrms were required to: (1) register with the
SEC; (2) provide regular updates on their ﬁnancial position, such as audited balance sheets and
income statements; (3) issue detailed proxy statements to shareholders, and (4) report on insider
holdings and trades.
The 1964 Amendments provide a compelling setting for evaluating the consequences of manda-
1tory disclosure regulations for at last two reasons. First, this legislation did not aﬀect all ﬁrms
equally. One category of OTC ﬁrms was entirely free of all mandatory disclosure requirements
before 1964, but were required to comply with all four types of disclosure after the law. The
1964 legislation required a second set of OTC ﬁrms, which was already fulﬁlling (1) and (2), to
begin complying with (3) and (4). Small OTC ﬁrms below the asset or shareholder ﬂoors were
only aﬀected by the 1964 Amendments if they grew above the size cutoﬀs. In contrast, NYSE and
AMEX ﬁrms were entirely unaﬀected by the law, because they had been subject to all four of the
mandatory disclosure requirements since the 1934 legislation.
We compare the stock returns and changes in operating performance of aﬀected OTC ﬁrms
with NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms. We also contrast these outcomes among OTC ﬁrms that are diﬀeren-
tially aﬀected by the 1964 Amendments. This research design provides an opportunity to avoid
confounding the eﬀect of the law with unobserved shocks to all ﬁrms’ stock returns and operating
performance. This feature of the analysis is an improvement on much of the previous empirical
research on mandatory disclosure laws (e.g., Stigler [1964], Friend and Herman [1964], Robbins and
Werner [1964], Jarrell [1981]).1
Second, the timing of the debate, passage, and initial enforcement of the Amendments generates
potentially informative inter-temporal variation in the expected eﬀects of the law. During the period
from January 1, 1963 through November 15, 1965, which we label Period 1, the 1964 Amendments
were initially proposed and passed into legislation, and it was revealed which individual ﬁrms
registered with the SEC. If market participants expected the disclosure requirements to produce
information that they valued, we expect positive abnormal excess returns for aﬀected OTC ﬁrms
(relative to unaﬀected NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms) in this period.
During the period which runs from November 15, 1965 through the end of 1966, labeled Period
2, virtually no new information about the law or which ﬁrms would comply with its requirements
was revealed. This period is therefore used to assess the validity of our approach. Speciﬁcally,
failure to reject the null of zero abnormal excess returns for aﬀected OTC groups in this period
1Chow [1983], Simon [1989], and Bushee and Leuz [2005] are important exceptions in that they exploit variation
in how mandatory disclosure laws aﬀected diﬀerent categories of ﬁrms. Chow [1983] found that the 1933 Act lowered
shareholder value, though the generality of his ﬁndings are limited by the paper’s small sample size. Simon [1989]
found that investor forecast errors (the dispersion of abnormal returns) were lower following the 1933 Securities Act.
Her sample is limited to newly issued securities. Bushee and Leuz [2005] examine the imposition of the same set of
disclosure requirements as those in the 1964 Amendments, when these were applied to the small companies traded
on the OTC Bulletin Board in 1999. They ﬁnd that a large fraction of ﬁrms delist in response to the increased
disclosure requirements and the decision to delist is associated with a 6 to 25 percent decline in market capitalization.
Companies in their sample had a mean market capitalization of roughly $9 million (2005$), while the ﬁrms in our
sample that were newly required to begin complying with all four forms of mandatory disclosure under the 1964
legislation had a mean (median) market capitalization of approximately $280 million ($57 million) (2005$).
2provides support for the validity of our research design and any ﬁndings from Period 1.
One reason that the 1964 Amendments have not been studied widely is that electronic data
on OTC ﬁrms is unavailable in this period. We created the equivalent of the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) data set for a large sample of OTC ﬁrms from 1963 through 1966.
We combined OTC stock price listings in printed versions of Barron’s newspapers and data from
eleven other publications to create a data ﬁle with information on share prices, dividends, stock
splits, mergers, name changes, liquidations, accounting variables, and the SEC ﬁling status of 1,196
OTC ﬁrms. The resulting ﬁle is combined with data on NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms from the CRSP and
COMPUSTAT data ﬁles, supplemented with accounting data collected for NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms not
c o v e r e di nC O M P U S T A T .
The analysis begins with the most direct test available to us of whether shareholders valued the
disclosure requirements. A ﬁrm-level event study reveals that complying OTC ﬁrms had abnormal
excess returns of about 3.5 percent in the weeks immediately surrounding the announcement that
they had begun to comply with the new requirements. An appealing feature of this test is that the
date of these announcements varied from ﬁrm to ﬁrm.
Additional evidence that investors valued the 1964 Amendments comes from comparisons of
Period 1 returns across groups of OTC ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms that were required to begin
complying with all four disclosure requirements outperformed ﬁrms that were only required to
begin complying with disclosure types (3) and (4). The most aﬀected ﬁrms also outperformed
OTC ﬁrms that were not targeted by the legislation. These diﬀerences in returns are generally
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
To evaluate the total eﬀect of the 1964 Amendments, we turn to the full Period 1. In this
period, estimates from a series of speciﬁcations indicate that OTC ﬁrms that were newly required
to begin complying with all four forms of mandatory disclosure had statistically signiﬁcant positive
abnormal excess returns ranging between 11.5 and 22.1 percent, relative to size and book to market
matched NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms. The estimates are derived from regression models that adjust for
the market return and the size, book-to-market, and momentum factors (Fama and French [1993],
Carhart [1997]). They imply that the 1964 Amendments created $3.2 to $6.2 Billion (2005$’s)
of value for shareholders of the OTC ﬁrms in our sample. Furthermore, in Period 2, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of zero abnormal excess returns for the OTC ﬁrms in any speciﬁcations,
suggesting that these ﬁrms do not generally outperform the NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms.
We also test whether aﬀected ﬁrms’ operating performance improved after the Amendments
were in force. We ﬁnd that the most aﬀected OTC ﬁrms had greater income and sales growth
from 1962 to 1966 than unaﬀected NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms. This result suggest that the market’s
3expectations of improved performance were justiﬁed and helps to explain these ﬁrms’ higher stock
returns.
Factor adjustments are critical for only one of our ﬁndings. In Period 1, the most aﬀected OTC
ﬁrms’ stock returns exceed the returns of the unaﬀected NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms in the raw, unadjusted
data, but this diﬀerence is not statistically diﬀerent than zero. Factor adjustment does not drive
the event study results, the most aﬀected OTC ﬁrms’ high returns relative to the other OTC ﬁrms
in Period 1, the Period 2 results, or the operating performance results.
Overall, the results suggest that the beneﬁts of the 1964 Amendments substantially outweighed
t h ec o s to fc o m p l y i n gw i t ht h i sl a wa sm e a s u r e d by stock returns. This implies that the aﬀected
ﬁrms were not managed to maximize shareholder value prior to 1964. We cannot determine whether
this was because managers made negative net present value “empire building” acquisitions, lavished
excessive salaries or perks on themselves, engaged in insider trading that reduced the liquidity of
the ﬁrm’s shares, or some other mechanism. Regardless of the exact channel, these ﬁndings are
consistent with the notion that mandatory disclosure laws can cause managers to more narrowly
focus on the maximization of shareholder value. This ﬁnding is a necessary condition for a positive
welfare eﬀect, but it is not suﬃcient, because we cannot rule out the possibility that managers lost
an amount equal to that gained by shareholders.2
In the next section, we describe prior theoretical views on the value of mandatory disclosure
and brieﬂy review a model that helps frame our empirical analysis. In Section III, we provide some
historical background on disclosure regulation in U.S. equity markets and explain in more detail
why the 1964 Amendments provide a compelling environment to study the eﬀects of mandatory
disclosure laws. Sections IV and V describe our data and our empirical methodology, respectively.
The empirical results are presented in Section VI and interpreted in Section VII. Section VIII
concludes.
II. Theoretical Perspectives on Disclosure Regulation
Here, we brieﬂy review the broad arguments in favor of and against mandatory disclosure
requirements in securities markets.3 We also review the Shleifer and Wolfenzon [2002] model of
2To our knowledge, Ferrell [2004] is the only other empirical analysis of the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments.
We discuss this paper and contrast it with ours in the interpretation section.
3See Verrecchia [2001] for a review of the theoretical ﬁnancial disclosure literatures in accounting, economics, and
ﬁnance and Easterbrook and Fischel [1984] for a discussion of legal scholarship’s evidence on mandatory disclosure.
4ﬁnancial markets when insiders can divert ﬁrm resources. This model provides a framework to
interpret our empirical analysis.
II.A. Theoretical Background
One traditional view of securities market regulation, often attributed to Stigler [1964] and Coase
[1960], is that government intervention is at best ineﬀective and, at worst, damaging. The basis
of this view is that private contracts, combined with the possibility of litigation, between share-
holders on the one side and managers, underwriters, auditors, and analysts on the other, is a cost
eﬀective way to achieve eﬃcient disclosure. This private enforcement will be especially successful
in settings with repeated interactions where agents with superior information are concerned about
their reputations.
These views imply that a ﬁrm’s failure to provide some information must be due to the high
costs of provision, lack of value relevance, or valid concerns that competitors may beneﬁtf r o mi t s
release. In this setting, mandatory disclosure regulations are either inconsequential or cause ﬁrms
to release an ineﬃciently large amount of information.
An alternative view posits that prohibitively high costs of writing and enforcing complete con-
tracts make mandatory disclosure regulations welfare enhancing. There are at least three reasons
that regulations may be preferable to an exclusive reliance on private contracts. First, the costs
of ﬁling a lawsuit may introduce a free-rider problem among shareholders. In contrast, a regulator
does not face these coordination problems. Second, regulations that mandate increased provision of
information may be less vulnerable to subversion of justice than litigation (see Glaser and Shleifer
[2003]). Third, regulators’ exclusive focus on securities cases may make them more eﬀective than
judges or juries at detecting fraud.
II.B. Conceptual Framework
The starting point of the Shleifer and Wolfenzon [2002] model of ﬁnancial markets is that private
contracts cannot set the expected penalties for diversion of ﬁrm proﬁts by insiders high enough to
deter all diversion. We deﬁne diversion as any activity that does not maximize shareholder value,
including, but not limited to, expropriation of the cash ﬂow for insiders’ personal use, empire
building (e.g., negative net present value investments that increase insiders’ utility), and insider
trading, which reduces liquidity and thus the value of equity.
Shleifer and Wolfenzon [2002] consider an entrepreneur who needs outside funding to bring her
ideas to market. In exchange for these investments, she promises the outside shareholders a fraction
5o ft h ef u t u r ec a s hﬂow. The entrepreneur retains control of the ﬁrm, but she cannot credibly commit
to zero diversion before paying out dividends.
The price that outside shareholders will pay for a given fraction of shares depends on their
expectation of the degree of diversion, which depends on the magnitude of the contracting problem.
Outsiders invest contingent upon an expected return at least as great as on alternative investments.
In equilibrium, entrepreneurs divert ﬁrm resources and outside shareholders receive the market
return on their investment. The key insight is that stock returns do not depend on the level of
diversion, but stock prices do.
In this setting, consider the introduction of a regulatory policy that increases the expected
penalties for diversion, either by increasing the probability of detection or raising the penalty. This
policy will reduce the equilibrium level of diversion and, in turn, aﬀect insiders’ total payoﬀ and
ﬁrms’ share prices. Consequently, such a policy will have distributional eﬀects and may also impact
welfare. These eﬀects will diﬀer for ﬁrms organized before and after the policy’s introduction.
Consider ﬁrms that sold shares to the public before the policy was in force. The introduction of
the policy unexpectedly increases the expected penalties for diversion. This lowers the equilibrium
amount of diversion by entrepreneurs, which increases expected dividend payments to shareholders.
This causes a one-time increase in the value of these ﬁrms. However, after this jump in the stock
price, the return to holding shares in the ﬁrm will again equal the market return.
The increased stock price does not necessarily indicate an increase in welfare. Social welfare
is unaﬀected when the abnormal returns are solely due to a transfer of a ﬁxed set of resources
from one party (the entrepreneur) to another (outside investors). However, when diversion is costly
(e.g., if the total cost of a lavish oﬃce exceeds the entrepreneur’s private valuation), the reduced
diversion will generate welfare improvements.
Our paper tests whether the introduction of the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments led to abnor-
mal stock returns for ﬁrms that existed before the legislation was seriously considered. A rejection
of the null of zero abnormal stock returns for aﬀected ﬁrms would suggest that the information
revelation induced by the law was valued by outside shareholders. The basis for this test is the
notion that the 1964 Amendments unexpectedly decreased the expected beneﬁto fd i v e r s i o nf o r
insiders by increasing the expected penalties. Although diversion is unobservable, we will also test
whether aﬀected ﬁrms’ operating performance improved after the Amendments were in force.
Finally, in the context of the model, a ﬁnding of positive abnormal returns can be interpreted
as a necessary but not suﬃcient condition that the 1964 Amendments increased welfare. Shleifer
and Wolfenzon [2002] consider the case of ﬁrms that sell shares to the public after the regulatory
policy is in place. They show that the higher expected penalties for diversion aﬀect entrepreneurs’
6incentives so that in equilibrium there is less diversion and a more eﬃcient allocation of resources
across entrepreneurs. This theoretical ﬁnding highlights that the potential welfare gains from
mandatory disclosure laws extend beyond any gains associated with the set of ﬁrms that were
established before such laws were in force. However, an empirical examination of this prediction is
beyond the scope of the current paper.
III. Background on Federal Disclosure Regulations and a New Research Design
Our empirical analysis examines the impact of the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments on the
stock returns and operating performance of aﬀected ﬁrms. This section provides a brief history of
securities laws before the 1964 Amendments and how the structure of the legislation and the timing
of its passage and implementation provide a compelling research design to test for the eﬀects of
mandatory disclosure laws.4
III.A. Federal Regulation of Securities Markets Before 1964
Prior to 1933, there was little federal regulation of securities markets. The 1933 Securities Act
and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act marked a revolutionary foray into the regulation of securities
markets by the federal government. The 1934 Act created four mandatory disclosure requirements
that applied to some, but not all, existing ﬁrms. Here, we describe these disclosure requirements
and detail which categories of ﬁrms were required to comply with each of them. Speciﬁcally, they
are:
1. Firms listed on exchanges (such as the NYSE or AMEX) and OTC ﬁrms that had issued
securities of suﬃcient market value after May 1936 were required to register these securities
with the SEC. The registration statements had to contain detailed ﬁnancial information at the
time of registration, including: balance sheet and proﬁt and loss statements from the previous
three years; the terms and position of each class of outstanding securities; the organization,
ﬁnancial structure, and nature of the business; and the identity and remuneration of directors,
oﬃcers, and shareholders with more than a ten percent stake.
2. Firms listed on exchanges (such as the NYSE or AMEX) and OTC ﬁrms that had issued
securities of suﬃcient market value after May 1936 were required to ﬁle annual reports (Form
4This section draws heavily from Seligman [1995], as well as New York Times and Wall Street Journal articles
from the 1960’s. See these sources for more detailed legislative histories. See Mahoney [1995] for details on the
pre-1930’s history of disclosure regulation and Mahoney [2003] for a discussion of state “Blue Sky” laws.
710-K) and semi-annual reports (Form 9-K) with the SEC. They were also required to report
material events as they occurred (Form 8-K).5
3. Firms listed on exchanges were required to provide proxy statements in advance of share-
holder meetings or votes. These statements must contain information on the qualiﬁcations of
directors and nominees for directors, executive compensation, and transactions between the
company and its oﬃcers or directors. All OTC ﬁr m sw e r ee x e m p t e df r o mt h i sr e q u i r e m e n t .
4. Firms listed on exchanges were required to report the identities of oﬃcers, directors, and
large shareholders. They also had to report these individuals’ holdings of any equity security
of the company and provide monthly statements of any changes. Companies could recover
any proﬁts that an insider realized from the purchase and sale of the company’s stock in any
period of less than six months.6 All OTC ﬁrms were exempted from this requirement.
Thus, the 1933 and 1934 Acts created a system of regulation that imposed diﬀerent requirements
on ﬁrms, based on where their shares were traded and whether they had made substantial public
oﬀerings after 1936.
To summarize, all listed ﬁrms were subject to all four disclosure requirements, OTC ﬁrms
that had made substantial public oﬀerings since 1936 were subject to requirements (1) and (2)
above, and OTC ﬁrms that had not made a public oﬀering since 1936 were free from all disclosure
requirements no matter their size or how widely distributed their securities. Harvard Law Professor
Louis Loss [1983] said this system of regulation created, “...a double standard of investor protection
— a standard that resulted, more by accident than by design, from the piecemeal adoption of the
SEC statutes but that nevertheless glowed with an incandescent illogic...” (pp. 462-463).
The available evidence suggests that the relatively lax disclosure requirements for OTC ﬁrms
helped to create an environment where shareholders of these companies were often poorly informed
and had few avenues available to penalize management for failing to maximize shareholder value.
For example, in a study of a random sample of OTC securities conducted in 1962, the SEC found
that: more than a quarter of the ﬁrms did not provide any reports on the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial position
or results in that year; 73 percent of proxy solicitations involving the election of directors failed to
5The requirement that OTC ﬁrms with new oﬀerings comply with the periodic reporting requirements was added
in separate legislation passed in 1936. This legislation exempted ﬁrms for which the total market capitalization for
each security class issued was less than $2 million after the oﬀering. Further, a ﬁrm could cease ﬁling these reports
if and while the value of the security class of the newly issued security dropped below $1 million.
6Under this law, it was legal to trade on private information if the shares were held for longer than six months.
In 1968, a federal court gave the SEC the right to penalize all insider trading.
8include the names of the nominees; only 16 percent of these solicitations listed the directors’ quali-
ﬁcations; 95 percent of proxy solicitations for election of directors failed to report on management
compensation; 24 percent of the ﬁrms failed to solicit proxies before shareholder meetings; and in
two-thirds of the solicitations involving modiﬁcations of securities, the eﬀects of the modiﬁcation
on the rights of existing security holders were not given (United States Securities and Exchange
Commission [1963]).
Even if OTC ﬁrms released independently audited ﬁnancial statements, the information may
not have been considered credible by market participants. In the case of ﬁrms not covered by
the 1934 Securities Act, state courts had generally ruled that investors could not sue accountants
for negligently prepared ﬁnancial statements unless they had direct dealings with them (see Au-
genbraun’s [1993] discussion of “privity”). In principle, investors in these companies could sue
accountants for fraudulent statements, but, in practice, the legal standard for fraudulence was very
diﬃcult to meet. Consequently, these investors had little scope to penalize fraudulence through the
courts. In light of these ﬁndings, it may not be surprising that Seligman [1995] contends that the
“vast majority of securities fraud occurred among ﬁrms not subject to the SEC’s period reporting
requirements” (pp. 313-4).
Moreover, it was widely believed that many OTC ﬁrms chose not to list on exchanges precisely
to avoid the stricter disclosure requirements on the NYSE and AMEX.7 Although we were unable
to determine the precise listing requirements of the NYSE and AMEX in this period, market
capitalization has always been an important factor in determining eligibility for listing on these
exchanges. In our sample of 1196 OTC ﬁrms, there are 1,033 ﬁrms for which we could determine
their market value at the start of 1963. 532 (206) of these ﬁrms had a market capitalization
that exceeded the 25th (50th) percentile market capitalization of ﬁrms on the NYSE and AMEX
measured at the same time. It is evident that numerous OTC ﬁrms that appeared eligible for trading
on the more liquid NYSE/AMEX chose to remain on the OTC despite the apparent beneﬁts to
their shareholders from a switch.
III.B. Negotiation and Passage of the 1964 Amendments
Between 1934 and 1961, it was not uncommon for SEC staﬀers, legislators, or other prominent
public ﬁgures to call for an extension of the mandated reporting requirements to rectify the seem-
ingly arbitrary inequities in regulatory intensity. However, these recommendations never seemed to
gain any traction in Congress (see Loss [1983], page 464.) For example, Senator Frear of Delaware
7See United States Securities and Exchange Commission [1963] (especially, Part III, p. 16). Hereafter, we refer to
this as the Special Study.
9introduced a bill to extend mandatory disclosure in 1949, but no action was taken because attention
turned to higher priorities such as the Korean War (Special Study, part 3, page 7). In 1961, William
Cary, the new head of the SEC, called for the extension of the disclosure requirements to OTC
ﬁrms but his call failed to produce any real legislative action, like the previous calls for reform.
The political climate about extending mandatory disclosure requirements to OTC securities
c h a n g e di nt h ew a k eo ft h eS E C ’ sr e l e a s eo ft h eﬁrst part of the Special Study in April, 1963. This
study had been commissioned by Congress and the SEC’s mandate was to examine the functioning
of U.S. equity markets generally — not necessarily with a focus on OTC ﬁr m s .B u t ,b a s e do nt h e
ﬁndings about the operation of OTC ﬁrms (some of which were discussed in the previous subsec-
tion), William Cary included a letter in the Special Study stating that the SEC would make several
legislative recommendations, including expanding the disclosure requirements for OTC securities.
The Senate quickly reacted. On July 9, 1963, a subcommittee unanimously approved a bill
extending disclosure rules to all OTC ﬁrms. On July 30, 1963, the full Senate passed the Securities
Act Amendment which held OTC ﬁrms with at least $1 million of assets and 500 shareholders to
the same disclosure rules as the 1934 Act imposes on securities traded on the NYSE and AMEX.
The bill languished in the House for more than half a year until the winter of 1964 when
President Johnson made two public endorsements of the legislation before the House.8 AH o u s e
subcommittee passed the bill on March 19, 1964 and it was evident that it would soon become
law. The full House and Senate passed identical versions of the bill on August 5 and 6, 1964 and
Johnson signed it into law on August 20, 1964.
The law required that any OTC ﬁrm with at least 750 shareholders and $1 million of assets as
of the last day of its ﬁrst ﬁscal year to end after July 1, 1964 (or any year after that) must register
with the SEC within 120 days of the end of the ﬁscal year and begin to comply with the other three
types of disclosure.9 Based on 1961 asset and shareholder data, the Special Study estimated that
roughly 32 percent of OTC ﬁrms exceeded both the asset and shareholder ﬂoors. OTC ﬁrms with
fewer than 500 shareholders and/or $1 million in assets were unaﬀected by the 1964 Amendments.
III.C. The 1964 Amendments as a New Research Design
8The hold-up in the House was over the precise asset and shareholder ﬂoors and whether the insurance and banking
industries should be exempted. The bill’s general principle of increased disclosure was never seriously contested. The
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and National Association of Manufacturers did attempt to lobby against the bill on the
grounds that compliance would be costly and that business should be free of regulatory burdens. However, Edwin
Etherington, the president of the American Stock Exchange, estimated the annual compliance costs at approximately
$1500 to $3000 for most OTC companies that were to be covered by the bill and Congress seemed to ﬁnd this estimate
compelling.
9The compliance date for ﬁrms that met the asset test and had between 500 and 750 shareholders was the last
day of its ﬁrst ﬁscal year to end after July 1, 1966.
10The structure and timing of the 1964 Securities Act Amendments provides a compelling setting
to evaluate the impacts of mandatory disclosure laws on stock returns. This subsection details
how we exploit the structure of the legislation to create multiple groups of OTC ﬁrms that were
aﬀected by the legislation to varying degrees and NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms that were all unaﬀected. It
also explains how the legislation provides a natural way to divide the years 1963-1966 into two
periods to examine the law’s eﬀects and perform validation exercises of our approach.
First, we explain how we classify ﬁrms so that we can exploit ﬁrm variation. We divide the OTC
ﬁrms in our sample into four groups, based on their characteristics at the beginning of 1963 which
precedes any serious discussion of the 1964 Amendments. The aim is to use ex ante information to
categorize OTC ﬁrms into groups where we expect relatively large and small “treatment eﬀects” of
the disclosure requirements on stock returns as a means to check the validity of the results.10
To ﬁx thoughts, we deﬁne the expected treatment eﬀect for group i as ti = ti(∆Pi,∆Di).
Here, ∆Pi is the expected change in the fraction of OTC ﬁrms in group i that comply with the
mandatory disclosure requirements due to the 1964 Amendments. Some ﬁrms will not comply,
because they fall below the asset or shareholder ﬂoors for endogenous or exogenous reasons. ∆Di
denotes the expected change in diversion that occurs among ﬁrms in group i that are subject to the
mandatory disclosure requirements speciﬁed by the 1964 Amendments. ∆Di varies across groups
due to diﬀerences in the initial levels of diversion. We assume that the treatment eﬀect is increasing
in the expected fraction of complying ﬁrms (∂ti/∂∆Pi > 0) and in the reduction in diversion
conditional on compliance (∂ti/∂∆Di < 0).
Each OTC ﬁrm in our sample is assigned a value for their likely ∆P and ∆D and these values
are used to create the OTC groups. For simplicity, we assume that ∆P and ∆D take on two values,
high and low.11 The interaction of ∆P and ∆D deﬁnes four independent categories of ﬁrms, which
determine the OTC groups.
Measures of assets and number of shareholders in 1962 are used to assign ﬁrms to the high
and low categories for ∆P.W ea s s i g nah i g hv a l u eo f∆P to ﬁrms with measured assets in 1962
exceeding $1 million and more than 500 shareholders and to ﬁrms with measured assets exceeding
10We use pre-legislation information to assign ﬁrms to the OTC groups rather than ex-post compliance behavior for
two reasons. First, compliance is conditional on size. Therefore, ﬁrms that eventually did comply would mechanically
tend to have had higher returns in the past. Forming groups based on ex-ante variables avoids this problem. Second,
some ﬁrms may manipulate their assets or shareholders so they do not have to comply with the law. The policy
relevant treatment eﬀect will account for such (likely unavoidable) manipulation rather than looking only at ﬁrms
that comply.
11Note that high ∆D means a more negative number while high ∆P indicates a more positive number.
11$5 million but no shareholder data.12 We assign all other ﬁrms to the low category for ∆P.
Our expectation is that the 1964 Amendments induced larger reductions in diversion (i.e., ∆D)
among ﬁrms newly aﬀected by all four types of disclosure, compared to ﬁrms that were only newly
aﬀected by the proxy and insider trading regulations. Consequently, ﬁr m st h a tw e r en o tﬁling
annual reports with the SEC by the beginning of 1963 (see the Data Appendix for further details)
are assigned a high value for ∆D and ﬁrms that were ﬁling annual reports by then receive a low
value. SEC publications were used to determine which OTC ﬁrms were ﬁling periodic reports as
of the start of 1963.
The ﬁrst OTC group consists of ﬁrms assigned to the high category for ∆P and ∆D.A tt h e
beginning of 1963, these ﬁrms were not ﬁling annual reports with the SEC and were above the size
cutoﬀs speciﬁed in the 1964 Amendments. Henceforth, we refer to these ﬁrms as the 0-4 group.
The number before (after) the dash refers to the number of forms of disclosure that the ﬁrm was
required to comply with before (after) the 1964 Amendments were in force. We use this same
naming convention to denote the other groups.13
The second group consists of ﬁrms that were ﬁling annual reports with the SEC by the start
of 1963 and were above the 1964 Amendments’ size cutoﬀs. The ﬁrms in this group were assigned
to the high category for ∆P and low for ∆D. The 1964 Amendments subjected these ﬁrms to two
new disclosure rules — the proxy and insider transaction regulations. We label this group 2-4.
The third group is designated 0-0. It is comprised of ﬁrms that by the beginning of 1963 were
not ﬁling annual reports with the SEC and fell below the asset and/or shareholder ﬂoors of the
1964 Amendments. These ﬁrms were assigned to the low category for ∆P and high category for
∆D. The fourth and ﬁnal set of OTC ﬁrms is called the 2-2 group. By 1963, these ﬁrms were
ﬁling periodic reports with the SEC but fell below the 1964 Amendments’ asset and/or shareholder
ﬂoors. These ﬁrms are in the low category for ∆P and ∆D. See the Data Appendix for a more
detailed description of the precise rules used to assign ﬁrms to the diﬀerent OTC groups.
If the mandatory disclosure requirements were valued by outside shareholders, then we expect
the treatment eﬀects to diﬀer across OTC groups. In particular, our prediction is that the 0-4’s
treatment eﬀect will be the largest, because these ﬁrms are in the high category for both ∆P and
12There are no cases where shareholder information is available but assets are not available. The subsequent results
are insensitive to sensible changes in the asset cutoﬀ used for ﬁrms with missing shareholder data.
13Some ﬁrms in our 0-4 group may have registered under the 1933 Act (if they made a small public oﬀering after
1936). All ﬁrms that made a new or secondary oﬀering (of equity or debt) were required to ﬁle a registration statement
with the SEC under the 1933 Securities Act and send a prospectus to purchasers. The associated documents include
a “Schedule A” that lists detailed ﬁnancial information, including at least three years of balance sheet and income
statement data, and descriptions of the ﬁrm’s business, oﬃcers, costs of issuing the security, and intended use of any
capital.
12∆D. By analogous reasoning, we expect the 2-2’s treatment eﬀe c tt ob et h es m a l l e s tb e c a u s ei t s
ﬁrms are in the low category for both ∆P and ∆D. We predict that the 2-4’s and 0-0’s treatment
eﬀects are between the 0-4’s and 2-2’s eﬀects. The ordering of these two groups’ treatment eﬀects
depends on whether the eﬀect of ∆P or ∆D on stock returns is larger.
We also create groups of NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms and use them to mitigate the possibility of con-
founding the eﬀects of the 1964 Amendments with shocks to stock returns common to OTC and
NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms. These 4-4 groups are constructed so that the distributions of the underly-
ing ﬁrms’ market capitalizations and the ratio of book value of equity to market capitalizations
are similar to these distributions in the corresponding OTC group. We match these distributions
because Fama and French [1992] demonstrate that average stock returns vary systematically with
market capitalization and the book-to-market ratio. See the Data Appendix for further details on
the construction of the 4-4 groups.
Now we explain how we divide 1963-1966 into two periods so that our analysis can exploit
time variation in regulatory status.14 Period 1 runs from January 1, 1963 through November 15,
1965. During this period, the 1964 Amendments were initially proposed, passed into legislation,
and it was revealed which individual ﬁrms registered under the 1964 Amendments with the SEC.
We assume that the full impact of the 1964 Amendments on stock returns occurs in this period.
Data from this period is used to test the null hypotheses that the OTC groups had zero abnormal
excess returns, relative to their corresponding size and book-to-market matched NYSE/AMEX
(4-4) groups. A failure to reject the null would suggest that the disclosure requirements were not
expected to produce information that was valued by outside shareholders (after accounting for
compliance costs).
We also divide Period 1 into two subperiods to separately examine the stock returns of the OTC
groups in the 85 weeks lasting from January 1, 1963 through August 24, 1964 (i.e., Period 1a) and
the 64 weeks from August 25, 1964 through November, 15, 1965 (i.e., Period 1b). During Period
1a, the probability that a law extending the four disclosure requirements to OTC ﬁrms increased
from some unknown level to one.15 Thus, this subperiod provides an opportunity to gauge the
share of any overall Period 1 eﬀect that is due to forward-looking asset markets’ expectation of the
law’s value to shareholders.
14See Table I for an outline of key dates associated with the passage and implementation of the 1964 Securities
Amendments, as well as a summary of the periods we deﬁne for our analysis.
15Although the Special Study was released on April 3, 1963, we suspect that its basic ﬁndings may have begun to
permeate the investment community earlier. How much earlier is unknown, so the choice of January 1 as a beginning
date has an element of arbitrariness. The choice of August 24, 1964 as an end date seems uncontroversial, as that is
t h ed a t eo ft h eﬁrst issue of Barron’s after Johnson signed the bill.
13During Period 1b, OTC ﬁrms above the size cutoﬀs were required to begin to comply with the
Amendments’ disclosure requirements. Here, we assess the share of any Period 1 eﬀect that is due
to the market’s incorrect ex ante expectations about the fraction of ﬁrms that would comply or the
average ﬁnancial position revealed in the registration statements. Because the 1964 Amendments
were the ﬁrst imposition of disclosure requirements in three decades, it may be reasonable to expect
that market participants updated their estimates of the impact of these disclosure requirements (in
terms of ∆P or ∆D) during this subperiod.
Period 2 runs from November 15, 1965 through the end of 1966 and during these 58 weeks
virtually no new information about the law or which ﬁr m sw o u l dc o m p l yw i t hi t sr e q u i r e m e n t sw a s
revealed. We use this period to assess the validity of our approach. Speciﬁcally, rejection of the
null of zero abnormal excess returns for aﬀected OTC groups in this period would invalidate our
research design and any ﬁndings from Period 1.
Finally, ﬁrms’ deadlines for complying with the new disclosure requirements were based on
their ﬁscal year end and this provides an especially powerful test of whether shareholders valued
the disclosure requirements. We implement an event study analysis with data from Period 1b to
test whether ﬁrms had abnormal excess returns in the weeks that news of their compliance with the
disclosure requirements became known to market participants. We assume that, after the passage
of the 1964 Amendments, the market’s expectation of any individual ﬁrm complying was between
zero and one and that this probability then increased to one or declined to zero upon news about a
ﬁrm’s decision to comply.16 Due to variation across ﬁrms in ﬁscal year ends, the ﬁrst registrations
under the 1964 Amendments were ﬁled with the SEC in the fall of 1964 but initial ﬁlings continued
through the end of October, 1965. Consequently, this event study allows us to exploit ﬁrm-level
(rather than group-level) variation.
IV. Data
IV.A. Data Sources
We use the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP R °) database to calculate returns of
NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms for the 1963-1966 period. We restrict the sample to those ﬁrms present in the
ﬁrst week of January 1963 and this sample of ﬁrms is intentionally not refreshed in later weeks. A
corresponding electronic dataset of OTC ﬁrms did not exist for the period we study, as OTC (i.e.,
NASDAQ) ﬁrms are not available in CRSP until December 1972.
16Even if the market had the correct expectations about the percentage of ﬁrms in one of the OTC groups that
would comply with the law, it is unlikely that the market had the correct expectations about each ﬁrm in the group.
14We therefore created the equivalent of the CRSP database for 1,196 OTC securities for the
1963-1966 period. The sample is comprised of securities that appeared in the January 7, 1963 issue
of Barron’s and were potentially aﬀected by the 1964 Amendments. The bid and ask share prices
for these ﬁrms were determined from Barron’s weekly publications from the sample’s four years.
The relevant pages were photocopied and scanned in the U.S. and then converted to electronic ﬁles
by Mascon Computer Services (P)Ltd. of India.17 We formed a panel data ﬁle of these securities
by using their reported name to match ﬁr m sa c r o s si s s u e so fBarron’s. Just like the NYSE/AMEX
sample, the panel of OTC ﬁrms is never refreshed with entrants to the Barron’s OTC stock tables,
because our goal is to estimate the impact of the imposition of mandated disclosure requirements
on an existing set of ﬁrms.
The calculation of weekly OTC returns required the compilation of data on weekly bid and
ask share prices, dividends, stock splits, mergers, name changes, liquidations, and moves from
OTC to NYSE/AMEX. We also collected data on the ﬁrms’ industries, ﬁnancial and accounting
positions in 1962 and 1966, as well as information on which ﬁrms ﬁled reports with the SEC in each
year of our sample, and the exact date that complying OTC ﬁrms ﬁled with the SEC for the ﬁrst
time. The resulting database is derived from hand-entered information from eleven separate sources:
Barron’s, Standard and Poor’s Annual Dividend Record, National Stock Summary (NSS), Directory
of Obsolete Securities, Moody’s Industrial Manual, Moody’s Public Utility Manual, Moody’s Bank
and Financial Manual, Moody’s Transportation Manual, Directory of Companies Filing Annual
Reports with the SEC Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEC Directory), U.S. SEC
News Digest,a n dSecurity Owner’s Stock Guide. We used the COMPUSTAT electronic ﬁles to
obtain accounting information for the NYSE/AMEX ﬁrm and supplemented this with information
from the four Moody’s Manuals for NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms not covered in COMPUSTAT. The Data
Appendix reviews our extensive data quality assurance procedures and provides some further details
on the resulting data ﬁle.
IV.B. Summary Statistics
Table II reports summary statistics from our data ﬁle for each of the four OTC groups and
the ﬁrms listed on the NYSE/AMEX. Panel A displays the number of ﬁrms in each of the groups
in the ﬁrst week of 1963 and their survival rate in our sample as of the last week of 1966. The
0-4 group has 240 ﬁrms in the beginning of 1963. This group is considerably smaller than the 2-4
17Mascon double entered the security name and the bid and ask prices from each issue of Barron’s. Mascon
guarantees a 99.9 percent accuracy rate. The Data Appendix details the numerous data quality checks we undertook
as a further precaution against transcription errors, as well as our extensive procedures to assign exit returns to ﬁrms
that disappear from our sample.
15group, which initially has 738 ﬁrms, because many 1963 OTC ﬁrms had made a public oﬀering
in the previous twenty-seven years. The samples of 0-0 and 2-2 ﬁrms are substantially smaller,
because Barron’s selected the largest and most actively traded OTC ﬁr m sf o ri n c l u s i o ni nt h e i r
stock tables. CRSP lists 1,915 NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms that meet our sample requirements.
Survival rates vary across the diﬀerent groups. The rates are roughly comparable among the
0-4, 2-4, and 4-4 groups and are even closer after matching on total market capitalization.18 This
similarity in survival rates suggests that the OTC groups’ attrition rates are due to genuine attrition,
not insuﬃcient data collection eﬀorts on our part. The 0-0 and 2-2 groups have lower survival rates,
because the 1964 Amendments’ size cutoﬀs ensure that they are comprised of small ﬁrms. As will
become evident below, these groups’ small starting size and high attrition rates make meaningful
inference diﬃcult in parts of the subsequent analysis.
Panel B of Table II reports the percentage of ﬁrms that have complied with all four mandatory
disclosure requirements as of July of the years 1963-1967.19 There was a dramatic increase in the
percentage of OTC ﬁrms complying between 1964 and 1965 (the ﬁrst year that many of these
ﬁrms were required to ﬁle with the SEC). This suggests that managers of many ﬁrms considered
the costs of non-compliance (the statutory penalties or costs of reducing ﬁrm assets or number of
shareholders or going private) to be greater than the beneﬁts. Further, our rules for assigning OTC
ﬁrms to the groups appear to be validated by the larger increases in ﬁling probabilities for the 0-4
and 2-4 groups.
Panel C reports the means and medians (in parentheses) of a number of important variables
as of the beginning of 1963, by OTC group. The number of ﬁrms with non-missing data is also
reported. The Barron’s and CRSP data are used to determine the share prices (calculated as the
mean of the bid and ask prices for OTC ﬁrms) and the bid-ask spreads as a percentage of the share
price from the ﬁrst week of 1963 for the OTC groups. The entries indicate that the median share
price among 0-4 and 2-4 ﬁrms is nearly three times greater than the median among the 0-0 and
2-2 ﬁrms. This is informative because share price is typically correlated with market capitalization
and this variable is unavailable for many of the 0-0 and 2-2 ﬁrms.
18For example, the median market capitalization of ﬁrms in the 0-4 and 2-4 groups would place those ﬁrms in the
second quintile of market capitalization among NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms (where quintile 1 is comprised of the smallest
ﬁrms). The survival rate of quintile 2 NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms is 81.2 percent between 1963 and 1966, which is in between
the 0-4 and 2-4 survival rates.
19Speciﬁcally, we consider an OTC ﬁrm to be in compliance with all four mandatory disclosure requirements if (1)
the ﬁrm is in the 0-4 or 0-0 group and is included in that year’s SEC Directory or is acquired by a ﬁrm listed in that
publication, or (2) the ﬁrm is in the 2-4 or 2-2 group and is included in the U.S. SEC News Digest in an issue prior
to July of the year, or is acquired by a ﬁrm listed in that publication, or (3) the ﬁrm moved to the NYSE/AMEX,
or was acquired by a ﬁrm on one of these exchanges prior to July of the year.
16Numerous theoretical studies have argued that bid-ask spreads reﬂect information asymmetry
between insiders with private information and outside shareholders (see Madhavan [2000] for further
background.). The bid-ask entries reveal that, after crudely controlling for size, ﬁrms that were
already ﬁling with the SEC at the start of 1963 had lower percentage bid-ask spreads than the
ﬁrms that were free of SEC disclosure requirements. Speciﬁcally, the 2-4’s (2-2’s) percentage bid-
ask spread is lower than the 0-4’s (0-0’s). We also explored this possibility more formally in a
regression framework and found that after adjustment for the inverse of the share price, the bid-ask
spread was about one percentage point lower for 1963 ﬁlers than non-ﬁlers. These ﬁndings are
consistent with the possibility that the information provided through registration with the SEC
and the periodic ﬁlings reduced information diﬀerences between outside investors and insiders.
The remainder of the table reports on a series of 1962 ﬁrm-level variables collected from various
issues of the Moody’s Manuals,C O M P U S T A T ,a n dt h eS & P ’ sSecurity Owner’s Stock Guide.T h e
mean (median) market capitalization (in millions of 1963 $’s) for the 0-4 and 2-4 groups are $44.6
($9.1) and $26.5 ($10.4), respectively. The total market capitalizations of these two groups in
2005$’s are $66 billion and $122 billion, respectively.
The ﬁnal row examines the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutions.20 These data
are available for roughly half and two-thirds of the 0-4 and 2-4 ﬁrms, respectively. Conditional
on non-missing data, the mean of this variable is roughly four percent in both groups. This
demonstrates that institutions did not have a prohibition against holding shares of ﬁrms that were
not registered with the SEC. Consequently, it is unlikely that the 0-4 ﬁrms’ positive abnormal
excess returns documented below are due to downward sloping demand curves for these stocks and
an increase in buyers eligible to purchase them after the passage of the 1964 Amendments.
Market capitalization is available for less than thirty percent of the 0-0 and 2-2 ﬁrms. The
accounting data are more likely to be non-missing and these variables conﬁrm that the 0-0 and 2-2
ﬁrms are much smaller than the 0-4 and 2-4 ﬁrms (e.g., see assets).
Overall, Panel C paints a mixed picture on the extent of informational aysmmetries between
insiders and outsiders. On the one hand, market capitalization and accounting data is available for
virtually all 0-4 and 2-4 ﬁrms. The similarity in the availability of information in these groups of
pre-1963 non-ﬁlers and ﬁlers suggests that private markets via third parties like Moody’s produced
much of the information that shareholders were likely to value. On the other hand, the ﬁnding that
the bid-ask spreads were larger for non-ﬁlers undermines this view. One possibility is that these
larger bid-ask spreads reﬂect an inability to set appropriate penalties for insiders that provided
20These calculations are based on data from institutional shareholders, including investment companies, ﬁre, casu-
alty and life insurance companies, pension funds and retirement systems.
17false information to the market.
V. Empirical Methodology
We construct time series of the equal-weighted portfolio returns for the OTC and NYSE/AMEX











i=1(Pigt − Pig,t−1 + Digt)/Pig,t−1 (1)
where Rgt is the return for holding the group g portfolio from the end of week t − 1 to the end of
week t. The return for each security in the portfolio, Rigt, is calculated as the change in the split-
adjusted price per share at the ends of week t and t−1 (i.e., Pigt −Pig,t−1), plus any split-adjusted
dividends paid between the price observations (i.e., Digt), all divided by the split-adjusted price at
the end of week t − 1. Pigt is equal to the mean of the bid and ask prices for a security in week t.
Ngt is the number of ﬁrms in group g in week t.
We model the returns using a standard four-factor model:
Rgt − Rft = αg + β1g (Rmt − Rft)+β2gSMBt + β3gHMLt + β4gMOMt + εgt (2)
where Rft is the return on a risk-free asset, which is measured as the Treasury bill rate. This
equation controls for the diﬀerence between market and risk-free returns, the size and book-to-
market factors of Fama and French [1993], and a momentum factor based on Carhart [1997]. The
market return, Rmt, is measured as the value-weighted CRSP return using all NYSE and AMEX
ﬁrms present in weeks t and t − 1. The three factors are measured as the diﬀerence in the returns
of portfolios of small and large stocks (SMB), value and growth stocks (HML), and stocks with
high and low returns over the two to twelve months prior to the current date (MOM).21 The g
subscript on the parameters underscores that the eﬀect of the factors can vary across groups. εgt is
the unobserved determinant of group g’s return.
αg measures the abnormal excess returns speciﬁct og r o u pg. The appeal of this measure of
abnormal returns is that it has been purged of any covariance of group g’s return with the overall
21Kenneth French generously provided us with the SMB and HML daily factor series from 1963-1966.
Using daily return data, we calculated the weekly momentum series based on the formulas on French’s web page
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.)
There are two important consequences of the fact that the market return and three factors are calculated with
NYSE and AMEX data. First, incomplete market capitalization and accounting data for the OTC ﬁrms do not pose
a problem for estimation. Second, all the listed ﬁrms are unaﬀected by the 1964 Amendments so the factors are not
a function of the law.
18market and the three factors. This is important because a group may have high or low returns in the
examined period simply because of its risk relative to the market or because it is disproportionately
comprised of small, value, and/or high momentum ﬁrms.22 The ﬁtting of equation (2) is considered
a standard method to test for abnormal excess returns.
It is tempting to interpret the estimated αg’s from Period 1 for the OTC groups as the eﬀect
of the 1964 Amendments. The credibility of this interpretation rests on the assumption that the
four-factor model has adequately adjusted for all systematic determinants of stock returns, except
the 1964 Amendments. This assumption is invalid if there are shocks to the returns of OTC and
NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms of the size or market to book ratio typical in one (or all) of the OTC groups
that are not fully controlled for in equation (2). In this case, the estimated αg would capture the
eﬀect of the 1964 Amendments and these shocks.
To mitigate the possibility of confounding the eﬀects of the 1964 Amendments with unrelated
shocks to stock returns, we diﬀerence versions of equation (2) for each OTC group and its cor-
responding size- and book-to-market-matched 4-4 group. An example of special interest is the
diﬀerence between the 0-4 group and its corresponding 4-4 group, which becomes:
R0−4,t − R0−4
4−4,t =( α0−4 − α4−4)+( β1,0−4 − β1,4−4)(Rmt − Rft)+( β2,0−4 − β2,4−4)SMBt
+(β3,0−4 − β3,4−4)HMLt +( β4,0−4 − β4,4−4)MOMt +( ε0−4,t − ε4−4,t), (3)
where R0−4
4−4,t equals the return of the 0-4 matched 4-4 group in week t. The diﬀerencing removes all
shocks common to the 0-4 and matched 4-4 group from equation (3), so such shocks cannot cause
the model to be speciﬁed incorrectly. The estimated β’s measure the diﬀerence in the loadings
between the 0-4 and matched 4-4 groups.
The parameter of interest is (α0−4−α4−4), which is the diﬀerence in the abnormal excess returns
between the 0-4 and the matched 4-4 group. We test the null hypothesis that this parameter is
equal to zero for all OTC groups and interpret a rejection of the null in Period 1 as evidence that the
1964 Amendments aﬀected stock returns. This test is also implemented in Period 2 as a check on
the validity of the model. We also report estimates of αg for the OTC groups from the estimation
of equation (2), though these results are not our focus because they are less likely to be reliable. To
account for the possibility of unequal variances across weeks, we present standard errors calculated
with the Eicker-White formula that allows for heteroscedasticity of an unspeciﬁed form throughout
the paper.
22In the cross-section of U.S. stocks, it is well documented that the α’s from a four-factor model are much more
tightly distributed around zero than the α’s from the basic CAPM using Rmt − Rft as the only factor.
19Four other features of our approach merit highlighting. First, as equation (1) indicates, a
portfolio’s weekly return is calculated as the simple average across the returns of ﬁrms in that
portfolio. This is equivalent to a portfolio that is rebalanced every week to ensure an equal weighting
across all ﬁrms. The advantage of this approach is that returns can be calculated when the number
of shares outstanding is unknown. The primary shortcomings are that such a portfolio would
involve large transactions costs, and it does not mimic the buy-and-hold portfolio strategies that
many investors utilize.
We probe the robustness of our results to alternative portfolio construction strategies in a few
ways. We present results from a buy-and-hold strategy with equal initial weighting. This approach
begins by putting an equal dollar value in each stock in the relevant OTC or NYSE/AMEX group
and then assumes that no trades are made subsequently. In the calculation of the portfolio’s return
from date t to t+1,s t o c ki’s weight equals (value of holdings of stock i at t)/(total value of portfolio
at t). Consequently, the weight on a particular stock evolves over time based on its returns relative
to the rest of the portfolio.23 We also implement a value-weighted buy-and-hold strategy, where
each ﬁrm’s initial weight is equal to the ﬁrm’s share of the portfolio’s total market capitalization
at the beginning of the relevant period.24 The weights then evolve in the same way as in the
buy-and-hold with equal initial weighting approach.
Second, the estimated abnormal excess return from equation (3) may be biased by industry-
speciﬁc shocks that are unrelated to the law if there are diﬀerences in the industry composition of
the OTC and 4-4 groups. To probe this possibility, we also present results where the weekly returns
for the companion 4-4 groups are calculated with the week-speciﬁc 2-digit SIC industry weights of
the relevant OTC groups.25
Third, shocks speciﬁc to the OTC market that are unrelated to the law remain a potential
source of confounding. To probe the robustness of the results to this possibility, we test whether
the 0-4 group, which we suspect was the most aﬀected by the legislation, had larger abnormal excess
23We use this approach to construct buy-and-hold portfolio returns rather than the approach of averaging ﬁrm level
buy-and-hold time series used by Loughran and Ritter [1995] and others. The statistical properties of the alternative
approach are less well understood. We want to ensure that any diﬀerences in results between our equal-weighted
portfolios and portfolios designed to mimic a buy-and-hold strategy are not driven by such issues.
24This approach requires data on the shares outstanding to calculate ﬁrms’ market capitalization. Because this
variable is missing for 81 percent and 59 percent of the 0-0 and 2-2 ﬁrms, respectively, the results of the value-weighted
buy-and-hold strategy are not fully comparable to those from the other strategies considered for these groups.
25We determined the primary industry for all ﬁrms in the 0-4, 2-4, and 2-2 groups. We were unable to ascertain
the industry for 24 ﬁrms in the 0-0 group. These ﬁrms are omitted from the calculation of industry adjusted returns,
so the 0-0 industry matched estimates are not comparable to results from the other portfolio construction methods.
We also attempted to match OTC ﬁrms to NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms on industry and market capitalization. Speciﬁcally,
we used all ﬁrms in the smallest six market capitalization deciles to calculate the 4-4 industry index returns. The
results from this approach are similar to the industry only matched returns presented below.
20returns than the other OTC groups. The law also potentially aﬀected the other groups, including
the 0-0 and 2-2 groups because some of their ﬁrms grew large enough to have to comply. Therefore,
any diﬀerence in returns between the 0-4 group and the other OTC groups is likely to understate
the total eﬀect of the mandatory disclosure requirements. Consequently, it is best conceived as a
robustness check of the qualitative results.
Fourth, a drawback of our comparison of returns during Periods 1 and 2 is that there is no
ﬁrm-level variation in the timing of these periods within the OTC groups. Recall, however, there
are ﬁrm-level diﬀerences in the timing of the resolution of the uncertainty surrounding which ﬁrms
would comply with the 1964 Amendments that are largely due to variation in ﬁscal year ends. We
exploit this variation to implement an event-study analysis in the weeks that news of ﬁrms’ initial
compliance became known to market participants.
VI. Results
VI.A. Firm-Level Event Study of Initial Filing
The analysis begins with a ﬁrm-level event study of the eﬀect of the announcement that OTC
ﬁrms were oﬃcially in compliance with the 1964 Amendment’s new mandatory disclosure require-
ments on stock returns. We obtained the precise dates that the SEC announced that pre-legislation
non-ﬁling ﬁrms had fulﬁlled the registration requirement and pre-legislation ﬁlers had fulﬁlled the
proxy and insider holdings/trades requirements for the ﬁrst time. These oﬃcial ﬁling dates were
collected from the daily issues of the SEC News Digest, which, as a matter of policy, published
them 60 days after the SEC received the ﬁlings. This delay means that the news of a ﬁrm’s ﬁling
with the SEC may have become known to market participants as early as 60 days preceding the
announcement or any time in between. For the remainder of this section, we refer to these ﬁrms as
“new ﬁlers” and the dates of the announcement in the SEC News Digest as the “ﬁling dates”.
We use these ﬁling dates as the basis of a ﬁrm-level event study of the eﬀect of choosing to
become a new ﬁler. Speciﬁcally, we estimate a ﬁrm-level version of equation (3). The dependent
variable is a ﬁrm’s weekly return minus that week’s average return for the ﬁrms in the size and
book-to-market cell of NYSE/AMEX that the OTC ﬁrm would have belonged to at the beginning
of 1963. This model is estimated with data from the 64-week-long Period 1b, which covers the
weeks when most aﬀected OTC ﬁrms were required to ﬁle with the SEC. The standard errors are
clustered by week to account for the likely covariance in return residuals across ﬁrms within a week.
The substantive diﬀerence with equation (3) is that we add an indicator variable that equals one
during the “event window” and its associated parameter is the focus of these regressions. Due to
21the uncertainty surrounding the exact date that the market learned that a ﬁrm had become a new
ﬁler, we deﬁne the event window so that it lasts for ten weeks. Speciﬁcally, it begins eight weeks
prior to the SEC ﬁling date and ends one week after this date. Week zero in event time is deﬁned
to include the SEC ﬁling date. The event window is extended one week beyond the ﬁling date to
allow the information to disseminate. Thus, the parameter on the event window indicator tests
for abnormal excess returns in the ten-week period when news of a ﬁrm’s decision to ﬁle became
known in the marketplace.
Each column of Table III presents the results from a separate regression. We report the para-
meter estimates and standard errors on the event window indicator and the constant, along with
the R-squared statistics. Columns (1)-(3) reports results for the 0-4 group and (4)-(6) contain the
analogous ﬁndings for the 2-4 group. In columns (1) and (4), the sample is limited to new ﬁlers
with ﬁling dates during Period 1b and the estimates are not adjusted for the market return or any
of the three other return factors. Thus, this speciﬁcation examines the diﬀerenced raw returns.
Columns (2) and (5) report the results from the same sample after adjustment for the full four
factor model. Columns (3) and (6) also present adjusted results but the respective samples now
also include 0-4 and 2-4 ﬁrms that moved to the NYSE/AMEX, ﬁled after the end of Period 1b,
or never ﬁled.26 The speciﬁcation and sample details are reported at the bottom of the table.27
The results provide striking evidence of positive abnormal excess returns for 0-4 and 2-4 ﬁlers
during the ten-week event window. The 0-4 ﬁlers have a positive abnormal excess return of about
0.35 percent per week during this event window, or a cumulative return of roughly 3.5 percent.
These estimates would be judged statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. This result is not
aﬀected by adjustment for the four factors and the change in sample. The 2-4 ﬁrms also experience
a statistically signiﬁcant positive abnormal excess return of approximately 0.35 percent per week
for a cumulative return of 3.5 percent during the event window. Similarly, the 2-4 estimates are
stable across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations.28
Figure 1 presents the 0-4 and 2-4 results graphically. These ﬁgures are derived from the column
26There are 215 (693) 0-4 (2-4) ﬁrms in the sample at the beginning of Period 1b. 145 (417) of these ﬁrms have a
ﬁling date in this period, while 13 (24) others have a ﬁling date between the end of Period 1b and the end of 1967.
30 (168) moved to the NYSE/AMEX in 1963, 1964, 1965 or 1966 where they were subject to all four mandatory
disclosure requirements. The remaining 27 (84) ﬁr m se i t h e rd on o th a v eaﬁling date by the end of 1967 or were
acquired by a ﬁrm without a ﬁling date by 1967.
27We did not implement the event study analysis for the 0-0 and 2-2 groups, because they included too few new
ﬁlers in Period 1b.
28When we ﬁtt h eﬁrm-level version of equation (2) that adjusts for the market and three other factors, the
cumulative event window returns are 3.2 percent and 3.3 percent for the 0-4 and 2-4 registrants, respectively. Recall,
this approach does not use the 4-4’s as a comparison group.
22(2) and (5) speciﬁcations that adjust for the four factors, except that we have dropped the event
window indicator. The average residuals are then calculated for each event week ranging from
twenty weeks before registration through 10 weeks after registration.29 These average residuals are
considered the average abnormal excess return in a week, where the precise week is denoted by its
distance from the week with the ﬁling date. The cumulative average abnormal excess returns are
plotted against the event week for the 0-4 and 2-4 groups. The vertical lines are drawn at event
weeks -9 and +1.
The ﬁgure provides an even more demanding test of the hypothesis that initial ﬁling is associated
with abnormal excess returns, because it is possible to observe the pre- and post-event window
trends. The ﬂat 0-4 and 2-4 lines between week -20 and week -9 suggest there are not abnormal
excess returns in this period. During the event window, the cumulative abnormal excess return
lines turn upward, graphically demonstrating the source of the results in Table 6. These lines are
ﬂat from week 1 through week 10.
We hoped to implement a similar analysis for the ﬁrms that chose not to comply with the
disclosure requirements. In these cases, the prediction is that conﬁrmation that a ﬁrm would
not comply with the disclosure requirements should lead to negative abnormal excess returns as
the probability of compliance changes from the market’s ex-ante estimate to zero. The practical
diﬃculty with implementing this analysis is that we were unable to isolate the precise dates that
this information became public. For example, it was not uncommon for the SEC to grant ﬁrms
extensions that delayed their statutorily required ﬁling date (sometimes even beyond the end of
Period 1b). We were unable to determine the identities of the ﬁrms that received these extensions.
Overall, Table III and Figure 1 provide strong evidence that the market rewarded ﬁrms that
complied with the mandatory disclosure requirements speciﬁed by the 1964 Amendments. However,
due to the forward looking nature of asset markets, it is possible that OTC ﬁrms had abnormal
excess returns in the period that the legislation was debated and ultimately passed. To estimate
the full eﬀect of the 1964 Amendments on stock returns, the next section tests for abnormal excess
returns among the OTC groups over the entire Period 1.
VI.B. Period 1
We begin with a graphical analysis of the unadjusted returns by OTC group. Figures 2a and
2b plot the cumulative average returns for the four OTC and matched NYSE/AMEX groups,
29The distribution of ﬁling dates is such that virtually all ﬁlers have observations for each of these event weeks.
This is not the case when the graph is expanded beyond t = -20 or t = 10. Further, the ﬁling dates for the 0-4 and
2-4 ﬁrms were distributed throughout Period 1b.
23respectively, over the course of our sample. Each data point represents a week’s return for a group
added to the sum of the return in all previous weeks. The ﬁrst vertical line denotes the end of
Period 1a and the second marks the end of Period 1b.
Figure 2a demonstrates that, by the end of Period 1, the cumulative returns (over the risk-free
rate) for the 0-4, 2-4, 0-0, and 2-2 groups were 55.9, 43.8, 38.0, and 31.7 percent, respectively.
These values for the raw return data are consistent with investors valuing the disclosures mandated
by the 1964 Amendments, because the groups most likely to have to make new disclosures (0-4 and
2-4 ﬁrms) have the highest returns. Further, the raw returns are consistent with the predictions
that the 0-4’s would have the largest returns and the 2-2’s would have the lowest returns in this
period. In contrast, Figure 2b shows that these diﬀerences in returns are not evident in the three
sets of NYSE/AMEX comparison ﬁrms with matching size and book-to-market characteristics.
Figures 3a and 3b depict the unadjusted cumulative returns for the 0-4, 2-4, and their matched
4-4 groups. Figure 3a reveals that the 0-4 group’s cumulative return exceeds the matched 4-4’s
returns by 7.8 percent over the course of Period 1. Notably, the 0-4’s excess returns ﬁrst become
apparent in mid-1964 when the legislative antecedents of the 1964 Amendments gained momentum
in Congress and increase steadily for the remainder of the period. Therefore, the subsequent results
will not be sensitive to reasonable changes in the start and end dates of the event window. From
Figure 3b, it is evident that the 2-4 group and its matched 4-4 group had virtually identical raw
returns in this period.30
We now turn to our statistical analysis of the Period 1 stock returns. Table IV presents estimates
of the abnormal excess returns for the 0-4 group in the ﬁrst panel and the subsequent panels report
results for the 2-4, 0-0, and 2-2 groups.31 Within a panel, we report estimates of α, its standard
error (in parentheses), and the R-squared statistic from the ﬁtting of two versions of equation
(2) and six variants of equation (3). We also report p-values from separate tests that the 0-4’s
estimated α is equal to the estimated α’s for the other OTC groups within a speciﬁcation (i.e.,
30The 0-0 and 2-2 groups underperformed their NYSE/AMEX comparison group but due to the small size of the
0-0 and 2-2 groups, their returns are estimated imprecisely. This makes a graph comparing their returns with their
matched 4-4 group less informative, so it is not presented here. The imprecision of comparisons between these groups
is demonstrated in Table IV below.
31Period 1 spans 149 weeks, but the regressions only include 148 observations because the OTC and NYSE/AMEX
stock returns are not comparable for the week of John F. Kennedy’s assassination. OTC trading was suspended
immediately upon the news that Kennedy had been wounded, but it continued for at least half an hour on the
NYSE and AMEX (Wall Street Journal, November 27, 1963). As a result, NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms had large declines
in that week while the returns of OTC ﬁrms were in line with a typical week. Consequently, we drop prices from
the assassination week and treat the returns from the week before the assassination to the week after as a single
observation.
24within a column).32
In columns (3)-(7) the 4-4 groups are constructed, as described above, so that the distributions
of the underlying ﬁrms’ market capitalizations and ratio of book to market are similar to the
distribution of these variables in the corresponding OTC groups. In column (8), we use an industry-
matched 4-4 group as the comparison but do not do any size or book to market matching due to
sample size issues. The table also explores the sensitivity of the results to alternative portfolio
construction rules. In all columns, except (6) and (7), we assume that investors in our constructed
portfolios rebalance their holdings every week to keep them equally weighted across all securities.
Column (6) reports the results from a buy-and-hold strategy with equal initial weighting. In column
(7), the portfolios are based on a value-weighted buy-and-hold strategy.33 The speciﬁcation details
for each column are summarized at the bottom of the table.
W ebe g i nw i t ht h ee q u a t i o n( 2 )s pe c i ﬁcations. The unadjusted entries in column (1) demonstrate
that the 0-4’s had a mean weekly return (above the risk-free rate) of 0.378 percent over the 149 week
period. Notably, the null hypothesis of equal returns for the 0-4 and 2-4 groups can be rejected
at the two percent level. In the case of the smaller 0-0 and 2-2 groups, the analogous nulls can
be rejected at the 15 and 10 percent levels, respectively, reﬂecting the imprecision of our estimates
of these groups’ returns. Overall, the raw data reveal that the diﬀerences in the returns of the
group expected to have the largest treatment eﬀe c ta n dt h eo t h e rO T Cg r o u p sa r es t a t i s t i c a l l y
distinguishable at reasonable conﬁdence levels.
In column (2), the OTC groups’ returns are adjusted with the standard four factor model,
which is considered a robust method for detecting abnormal excess returns. The entries indicate
that the 0-4 and 2-4 groups had average abnormal excess weekly returns of 0.187 percent and 0.095
percent, respectively. These estimates imply cumulative abnormal excess returns of 27.7 percent
and 14.1 percent and are statistically and economically signiﬁcant. In contrast, the point estimates
for the 0-0 and 2-2 groups are smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant. Appendix Table 2 reports
the estimated β’sf r o mﬁtting equation (2) for the four OTC groups and three corresponding 4-4
g r o u p sf o rP e r i o d1( a sw e l la sP e r i o d2 ) .
Columns (3) through (8) use the matched 4-4 groups as “control” groups to avoid confounding
the eﬀect of the law with shocks that were unrelated to the 1964 Amendments. The column (3)
entry for the 0-4 group is not adjusted for any of the four return factors and it indicates a weekly
32These tests are conducted by diﬀerencing the dependent variables, estimating equation (3), and testing whether
the α of the diﬀerenced equation is signiﬁcant.
33We drop one 0-4 ﬁrm (Royal Dutch/Shell) from the value weighted regressions, because it is 21 times larger than
the next biggest ﬁrm and accounts for 57 percent of that group’s total market capitalization at the beginning of the
sample.
25abnormal excess return of 0.053 percent. This is the statistical summary of Figure 3a and it
underscores that the Period 1 diﬀerences between the 0-4’s and their corresponding 4-4 group in
that ﬁgure are not statistically meaningful. However, the nulls that the 0-4’s returns are equal to
the other OTC groups’ returns (after subtracting the matching 4-4 control group returns from each
of the OTC groups’ returns) can all be rejected at the 10 percent level, further underscoring the
diﬀerences in returns across OTC groups.
The point estimates in the remaining columns range between 0.078 and 0.149 percent, which
imply cumulative returns ranging between 11.5 percent and 22.1 percent.34 The CAPM estimate
would be judged to be statistically signiﬁcant at the 11 percent level, while two of the four-factor
estimates are signiﬁcant at the one percent level or better, one at the four percent level, and one
at the nine percent level. The stability of the point estimates across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations is
reassuring. However, the diﬀerence between these results and the unadjusted estimate in column
(3) underscores that the validity of ascribing the diﬀerence in returns between the 0-4 group and its
matched 4-4 group to the 1964 Amendments rests on the validity of the standard model for stock
returns that adjusts for the market return and three factors.35 This contrasts with the ﬁndings
from the event study and the comparisons of returns across the four OTC groups, neither of which
hinge on whether we control for the four return factors.
We now turn to the results of ﬁtting equation (3) for the 2-4 group reported in columns (3)
through (8) of the second panel. The factor-adjusted point estimates range from 0.013 to 0.057
percent, which imply a cumulative abnormal excess return of 1.9-8.4 percent.36 Although these
estimates are all in a relatively tight range, none of them diﬀers statistically from zero at the ten
percent level. Overall, the 2-4’s ﬁndings provide modest support for the view that investors valued
34The estimates of the factor loadings (i.e., the β’s) will be biased if the securities of OTC ﬁrms are less likely
than those of NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms to be traded between weekly price observations. In this case, the estimated α’s
are likely to be biased. We suspect that “stale” OTC prices are unlikely to be a source of bias, because Barron’s only
includes the most heavily traded OTC ﬁrms. Nevertheless, we also estimated models for two-week and four-week
returns where this issue is much less relevant. The 0-4’s estimated α (standard error) from speciﬁcations that use the
matched 4-4’s as controls and adjust for the market and three factors are 0.180 (0.080) and 0.418 (0.110) for the two-
and four-week returns, respectively. When these estimates are divided by two and four, they are nearly identical to
the estimates in column (5). We conclude that these results are not due to stale OTC prices.
35Among the diﬀerent factors, the momentum factor has the least inﬂuence on the estimated α. The equation (3)
estimates of α and its standard error (in parentheses) from a speciﬁcation that weights the ﬁrms equally and adjusts
for the market return and the two Fama-French factors (but not the momentum, factor) are: 0.119 (0.045), 0.039
(0.041), -0.044 (0.096), and -0.124 (0.112) for the 0-4, 2-4, 0-0 and 2-2 groups, respectively. These estimates are very
similar to those in column (5) that are adjusted for all four return factors. The null hypothesis that the parameter
on the momentum factor is equal to zero cannot be rejected for any of the OTC or NYSE/AMEX groups in Period
1 (see Appendix Table 2).
36In ﬁve of the six speciﬁcations reported in columns (3) - (8), the null that the estimated α’s for the 0-4 and 2-4
groups are equal is rejected at the seven percent level or better.
26the introduction of proxy and insider trading disclosure requirements for ﬁrms that were already
registered with the SEC and ﬁling periodic reports. However, the imprecision of these estimates
tempers the strength of any conclusions.
The third and fourth panels report the results for the 0-0 and 2-2 groups. In columns (3)
through (8), all of the estimated α’s for these groups are negative and are smaller than the 0-4 and
2-4 groups’ estimated α’s. At least partially due to the small sample sizes for these groups, the
0-0’s and 2-2’s standard errors are generally more than twice as large as in the ﬁrst two panels.
This imprecision is evidenced by the fact that only three of the twelve estimates have an associated
t-statistic greater than one.
Table V presents the results from ﬁtting equations (2) and (3) in Periods 1a and 1b separately.
We only report the results for the 0-4 and 2-4 groups, because the estimated α’s for the 0-0 and 2-2
groups in these subperiods are even more poorly determined. The intent here is to assess whether
the Period 1 abnormal excess returns were concentrated in the weeks that the law was debated and
passed (Period 1a) or the weeks when ﬁrms’ compliance uncertainty was resolved and information
about their ﬁnancial position was revealed (Period 1b).
The results suggest that the 0-4’s had positive abnormal excess returns in both subperiods but
the bulk of them occurred while the law was debated and signed into law. The preferred Period
1a estimates in columns (4) through (8) are in a relatively narrow range and imply a cumulative
abnormal excess return ranging from 8.5 percent to 14.0 percent. Two of these ﬁve estimates
statistically diﬀer from zero at the ﬁve percent level, the other three only at the ﬁfteen percent
level.
The point estimates from the shorter Period 1b are generally smaller, more sensitive to changes
in speciﬁcation, and less likely to statistically diﬀer from zero. However, they jointly seem to
suggest that the 0-4’s had positive abnormal excess returns in this subperiod too. For example, the
estimate from the equal weighted four-factor model in column (5) implies a cumulative abnormal
excess return of roughly 6.8 percent. It appears that initial ﬁling announcements cannot account
for all of the abnormal excess returns in this subperiod.37
The 2-4 results fail to provide convincing evidence of abnormal excess returns in either subpe-
riod. The Period 1a point estimates are all positive, although it is only possible to reject a zero at
conventional levels in one of the speciﬁcations. The Period 1b estimates are sensitive to changes in
the speciﬁcation and are poorly determined.
37The largest diﬀerence between the Periods 1a and 1b estimates in columns (4) through (8) occurs in the value-
weighted buy-and-hold speciﬁcation, column (7). In this speciﬁcation, the abnormal excess returns are concentrated
in Period 1a. Because there was less compliance uncertainty surrounding large ﬁrms, it is not surprising that these
Period 1b returns, which weight ﬁrms according to their size, are smaller.
27Overall, the Period 1 results suggest that the mandatory disclosure requirements introduced
by the 1964 Amendments increased market participants’ valuations of the 0-4 ﬁrms by 11.5-22.1
percent. There is little evidence that the Amendments aﬀected the stock returns of the other OTC
groups in this period.
VI.C. Period 2
Recall, Period 2 is after the law has passed and the vast majority of complying ﬁrms have begun
to ﬁle with the SEC. Consequently, our expectation is that the OTC groups will have zero abnormal
excess returns in this period. If this null hypothesis is rejected by the data, it raises the possibility
that our research design and/or the four-factor model is invalid here, which would undermine the
credibility of the results from Period 1.
Table VI is structured identically to Table IV and reports the Period 2 results. The table
provides little evidence of abnormal excess returns for any of the OTC groups. For example, none
of the 32 estimates would be judged to be statistically diﬀerent from zero at the ten percent level.
It is notable that even the less robust equation (2) speciﬁcation fails to ﬁnd evidence of abnormal
excess returns. Overall, the ﬁndings from this 58-week period support the validity of our approach
and lend credibility to the hypothesis that the estimated eﬀects in period 1 are due to the 1964
Amendments.
VI.D. Operating Performance
As we discussed in Section II, our hypothesis is that mandatory disclosure laws bind managers
to focus more on maximizing shareholder value. The evidence of positive abnormal excess returns
for the 0-4 group in this period is consistent with this hypothesis but fails to shed light on exactly
why market participants were willing to pay more for an ownership stake. This subsection explores
one channel by testing whether OTC ﬁrms experienced improvements in operating performance
relative to 4-4 ﬁrms between 1962 and 1966.
Table VII reports the results of four ﬁrm-level operating performance regressions. In columns
(1) and (2), the dependent variable is the change in net income (proﬁts) between 1966 and 1962,
normalized by 1962 market capitalization. We normalize by market capitalization here, because
income can be zero or negative. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the percentage
change in sales between 1966 and 1962. Both net income and sales growth are considered important
measures of operating performance, although net income is more closely related to stock returns.
The starting sample includes all 2,893 0-4, 2-4, and 4-4 ﬁrms present in the ﬁrst week of 1963. In
columns (1) and (3), the sample is restricted to ﬁrms with known values for the dependent variable,
28which reduces the working samples to 2,408 and 2,331, respectively. Although the survival rates
for the 0-4 and 2-4 OTC groups and the 4-4 group are similar, sample selection concerns may still
be valid.38
Columns (2) and (4) address this sample selection issue by assigning the 50th and 10th per-
centiles of the dependent variables to ﬁrms with missing values for the dependent variables. Speciﬁ-
cally, ﬁrms with missing values that exit for “negative” reasons (for NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms: liquidation
or delisting; for OTC ﬁrms: liquidation or exit from our sample with a price less than $2) are as-
signed the 10th percentile of the dependent variable among ﬁr m si nt h e i rg r o u p( i . e . ,0 - 4 ,2 - 4 ,a n d
4-4). Firms with missing values that exit for more “neutral” reasons (for NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms:
mergers; for OTC ﬁrms: mergers, name changes, exit from our sample with a price above $2, and
moves to CRSP) are assigned the 50th percentile of the dependent variable for their group.
We report the parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) on indicator variables
for 0-4 and 2-4 status. The excluded category is 4-4 ﬁrms. The regression also adjusts for the log of
1962 assets to account for diﬀerences in growth related to size, and for one-digit industry dummies.
Due to concerns about outliers (especially data entry errors), we deleted observations that were in
the top and bottom one percent of the dependent variable. The subsequent results are not sensitive
to reasonable alternatives (e.g., two and ﬁve percent rules).39
The results indicate that 0-4 ﬁrms had the largest improvements in the two measures of operating
performance. Speciﬁcally, the 0-4 ﬁrms’ change in net income relative to initial market value was
about 0.030-0.038 larger than the 4-4’s. The mean of the dependent variable for 4-4 ﬁrms is 0.086,
so the 0-4’s increase in this measure of income growth was 35-44 percent larger than the 4-4’s. The
2-4 ﬁrms’ point estimates are roughly a third as large as the 0-4’s and would not be judged to be
statistically signiﬁcant by conventional criteria.
The sales growth results indicate that 0-4 ﬁrms’ total sales increased by a statistically signiﬁcant
84-109 percent more than the unaﬀected 4-4 ﬁrms. The 2-4 ﬁrms had smaller relative increases in
sales growth (i.e., 16-17 percent) and these estimates border on statistical signiﬁc a n c ea tt h eﬁve
percent level. To put these numbers in context, the mean sales growth of 4-4 ﬁrms was roughly
seventy percent, so the 0-4 ﬁrms’ sales increase appear quite large. To investigate this further, we
38More than half of the ﬁrms with missing value of the dependent values are ﬁr m st h a tw e r ei n v o l v e di nm e r g e r s
between 1962 and 1966. We do not use operating performance data for 1966 for ﬁr m si n v o l v e di nm e r g e r sb e c a u s e
these data may not be comparable to the 1962 numbers.
39An alternative adjustment for survivorship bias would be a Heckman selection model (Heckman [1979]). This
approach is not attractive in our setting because survival is directly related to performance, which makes it diﬃcult
to identify a valid exclusion restriction. Furthermore, identiﬁcation from functional form alone is problematic because
the 0-4 and 2-4 dummies are indicator variables (making identiﬁcation oﬀ of non-linearities impossible) and theory
provides little guidance on the functional form for log assets in either equation.
29estimated median regressions on the column (3) and (4) samples. They produced 0-4 indicator
point estimates of 0.087 and 0.174, respectively, both of which are statistically signiﬁcant. It is
evident that the 0-4 conditional mean results in Table VII are heavily inﬂuenced by the top part
of the percentage sales growth distribution.40
Overall, these results provide evidence that as soon as one year after most ﬁrms’ compliance
deadlines, the operating performance of 0-4 (and to a lesser degree 2-4) ﬁrms had improved, relative
to 4-4 ﬁrms. These ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that the mandatory disclosure
requirements caused managers to more directly focus on maximizing shareholder value.41
VII. Interpretation
Based on the varied evidence presented in this paper, we conclude that investors valued the
mandatory disclosure requirements imposed on 0-4 ﬁrms by the 1964 Amendments. We now try
to put these numbers in some context. The estimates of the cumulative abnormal excess returns
in Period 1 for the 0-4 ﬁrms ranged from 11.5 to 22.1 percent. Among the 236 0-4 ﬁrms with
non-missing market capitalization data, the total market capitalization was $4.5 billion (1963$).
These results imply that the 1964 Amendments created $0.5 to $1.0 billion (1963$) or $3.2 to $6.2
billion (2005$), of value for stockholders.42 These numbers understate the total increase in market
capitalization associated with the legislation, because our sample only includes a quarter of the
nearly 900 ﬁrms that ﬁl e dw i t ht h eS E Cf o rt h eﬁrst time after passage of the 1964 Amendments
(although it probably has many of the largest ones). As the conceptual framework highlighted,
these numbers are an upper bound on the welfare gain associated with these mandatory disclosure
regulations, because at least part of the gain in market capitalization reﬂects a transfer of insiders’
resources to outside shareholders.
40The 2-4 point estimates from the median sales growth regressions are qualitatively similar to the ones in Table
VII. Further, median regression has little eﬀect on the point estimates for the 0-4 and 2-4 indicators in net income
regressions.
41We considered studying alternative outcome variables to determine the mechanism for the 0-4’s Period 1 abnormal
excess stock returns. One potential mechanism is that the mandatory disclosure requirements might aﬀect the liquidity
of ﬁrms’ shares, which is thought to be reﬂected in bid-ask spreads. We could not investigate this possibility in a
meaningful way because there are not separate bid and ask prices for 4-4 ﬁrms and a substantial fraction of the 0-4’s
move to the NYSE/AMEX. Although our theoretical framework does not provide a clear prediction about volatility,
this may be a relevant outcome variable. Ferrell [2004] ﬁnds evidence of a reduction in volatility among OTC ﬁrms
after the 1964 Amendments are in force. We discuss the Ferrel paper in further detail in Section 7.
42To avoid potentially overstating the eﬀects, this calculation excludes the one 0-4 ﬁrm, Royal Dutch Company,
which by itself accounts for 57 percent of group 0-4’s market capitalization (and the exclusion of which leaves results
virtually unchanged, except naturally for the value weighted approach).
30In light of the magnitude of the increases in market capitalization, it is natural to wonder why
shareholders had not previously banded together to try to capture the $3.2 to $6.2 billion by forcing
insiders to move the companies to the NYSE/AMEX. We suspect that there are several possible
reasons. First, it is likely that some of the 0-4 ﬁrms did not meet the listing requirements for the
NYSE/AMEX (at the start of 1963, 48% of OTC ﬁrms in group 0-4 had market capitalizations
below the 25th percentile of the market capitalization of NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms). Second, insiders
may have owned more than half of the shares, making it impossible for outside shareholders to force
a move to the NYSE/AMEX. Third, it is probable that the $3.2 to $6.2 billion ﬁgure overstates the
resources that could be captured by shareholders, because it is likely that at least part of this ﬁgure
reﬂects a transfer from insiders via reduced diversion and/or increased eﬀort. To make this eﬀective
transfer, it seems reasonable to assume that insiders would have required increased compensation.
Fourth, the coordination of eﬀorts to induce a ﬁrm to move to the NYSE/AMEX has the features of
a classic public goods problem because the activist shareholder(s) cannot capture the full beneﬁts
of their eﬀorts.43
We now discuss the internal and external validity of our results. With regards to internal validity,
a few issues merit highlighting. First, some of the Period 1 unadjusted and adjusted results diﬀer.
In particular, the diﬀerence between the raw returns of the 0-4 group and its matched 4-4 group are
modest and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The diﬀerences in their returns are larger and
statistically signiﬁcant after adjustment for the market return and three other factors. Thus, the
validity of the claim that the mandatory disclosure requirements caused abnormal excess returns
for the 0-4’s relative to their 4-4 comparison group in Period 1 rests on the validity of the standard
four-factor model of stock returns. This contrasts with the event study results, the 0-4’s higher
returns relative to the other OTC groups, the Period 2 results, and the operating performance
results that do not rely on factor adjustment.
Second, several strands of the existing literature suggest that the large abnormal excess returns
we ﬁnd from improved protection of outsiders and associated reduction in expropriation by insiders
are plausible. For example, Schwert [1996] documents that takeover bids (often intended to displace
current management) on average are associated with about 25 percent cumulative abnormal excess
returns for the target company, with larger total eﬀects for deals that go through. Furthermore, even
the type of insider trading legal under the 1933, 1934, and 1964 Acts is associated with substantial
proﬁts to insiders and corresponding losses to outsiders (see, for example Seyhun [1986]). The
costs to outsiders from insider trading may have been even larger in the period before these Acts
43A ﬁfth possibility is that these OTC ﬁrms were stuck in a “disclosers’ dilemma” where ﬁrms beneﬁtf r o md i s c l o s i n g
if others disclose but non-disclosure is the best response to non-disclosure (Admati and Pﬂeiderer [2000]).
31increased the availability of reliable information about covered ﬁrms.
To the best of our knowledge, Ferrell [2004] is the only other study of the consequences of
the 1964 Amendments. That paper uses a 3-factor model and ﬁnds little diﬀerence between the
monthly abnormal excess returns of OTC and listed ﬁrms in the period from January 1, 1962
through January 1, 1965. However, there are a number of methodological diﬀerences that make it
diﬃcult to compare Ferrell’s result with this paper’s ﬁndings in a meaningful manner. Perhaps the
most important diﬀerence is that Ferrell [2004] does not divide the OTC ﬁrms into those that had
and had not previously registered with the SEC, nor into those above and below the size cutoﬀs
for the 1964 Amendments. In contrast, the division of the OTC ﬁrms into the 0-4, 2-4, 0-0, and
2-2 groups is a key feature of our analysis.44
We now assess whether our results can be applied to other contexts (i.e., their external validity).
Recall, the abnormal excess returns are concentrated in the 0-4 group and these ﬁrms are not a
random sample of ﬁrms. Rather, the majority of these ﬁrms gave up opportunities for access to
new capital through public oﬀerings and/or the greater liquidity of the NYSE/AMEX to avoid
triggering the disclosure requirements. Hence, our estimates should be considered an estimate of
the “treatment on the untreated.”45
T h et r e a t m e n to nt h eu n t r e a t e de ﬀect could be larger or smaller than the “average treatment
eﬀect,” which is the mean eﬀect of the imposition of disclosure requirements on all ﬁrms. On the one
hand, the treatment on the untreated eﬀect might overstate the market-wide beneﬁts of disclosure,
because the ﬁrms that chose disclosure voluntarily before 1964 (e.g. by listing on the NYSE/AMEX
or making a public oﬀering and thereby subjecting themselves to the 1933 and 1934 Acts) are likely
to be ones where insiders saw relatively little opportunity for diversion and therefore had little to
lose if they disclosed. On the other hand, if insiders also hold a large amount of stock in their own
companies, the ones who chose disclosure voluntarily might be precisely the ones whose companies’
market capitalization would beneﬁt the most from mandatory disclosure. In this case, the 0-4 ﬁrms’
returns to disclosure would be lower than the average returns to disclosure.
44Ferrell [2004] reports that his sample is drawn from the Primary and Eastern tables in the OTC section of Barron’s.
In contrast, our sample also includes ﬁrms from the Supplemental table. In our sample, roughly seventy-ﬁve percent
of the Primary and Eastern ﬁrms had registered with the SEC prior to the passage of the 1964 Amendments so we
suspect that Ferrell’s sample is primarily comprised of 2-2 and 2-4 ﬁrms. Recall, Table IV fails to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the returns of the 2-2 and 2-4 groups and their matched 4-4 groups. Other diﬀerences between the
studies’ examination of stock returns include: the papers divide the periods in diﬀerent ways; Ferrell [2004] appears
to not assign exit returns to ﬁrms that drop out of Barron’s or to follow the ones that move to the NYSE/AMEX;
Ferrell [2004]’s comparison group of exchange ﬁrms is not size or book-to-market matched; and our collection of the
exact ﬁling dates allows us to implement the event study tests of whether market participants valued the disclosure
requirements.
45See Angrist [1998], Heckman [2001], and Rubin [1977] for discussions of the “average treatment eﬀect,” “treatment
on the untreated,” and related issues.
32It is also important to highlight that the estimates may not be applicable to settings where
disclosure requirements are more stringent than those set forth in the Securities Act of 1933 and
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. For example, the results are unlikely to be directly informative
about the consequences of the recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States. However, our
ﬁndings are likely to be informative about the consequences of introducing mandatory disclosure
regulations in the numerous developed and developing country equity markets where disclosure
requirements are more lax than those speciﬁed in the U.S. legislation that is now more than 70
years old.
VIII. Conclusion
We analyze the last major imposition of mandatory disclosure requirements in U.S. equity
markets. The 1964 Securities Acts Amendments extended several disclosure requirements to large
ﬁrms traded over-the-counter (OTC) that had applied to listed ﬁrms since 1934. We ﬁnd four pieces
of evidence that investors valued these disclosure requirements. First, a ﬁrm-level event study
reveals that OTC ﬁrms most impacted by the 1964 Amendments had abnormal excess returns of
about 3.5 percent in the weeks immediately surrounding the announcement that they had begun
to comply with the new requirements. Second, OTC ﬁr m st h a tw e r em o s ta ﬀected by the 1964
Amendments had higher stock returns than those that were less aﬀected in the period between when
the legislation was initially proposed and when it went into force. Third, estimates from a series
of speciﬁcations indicate that the most aﬀected OTC ﬁrms had abnormal excess returns ranging
between 11.5 and 22.1 percent in the same period, relative to unaﬀected listed ﬁrms and after
adjustment for the standard four-factor model. This implies that the 1964 Amendments created
$3.2 to $6.2 billion (2005$’s) of value for shareholders of the OTC ﬁrms in our sample. Fourth, the
most aﬀected OTC ﬁrms had greater income and sales growth from 1962 to 1966 than unaﬀected
listed ﬁrms.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory disclosure laws can cause
managers to more narrowly focus on the maximization of shareholder value. However, the precise
welfare consequences are unknown, because we cannot determine how much of shareholders’ gains
were a transfer from the insiders of these same companies. If the widely held view that diversion
is ineﬃcient and involves welfare losses is correct, then these results should cause policy makers to
question the basis of recent calls to repeal U.S. federal mandatory disclosure requirements. Further,
they may provide the basis for reforms in equity markets where the forms of disclosure studied here
are not mandatory.
33Data Appendix
This data appendix describes the construction of the data set on OTC companies and their
stock returns from 1963-1966. It provides details on our quality assurance procedures, sample
selection rules, procedures for ﬁrms that exit the sample, determination of dividends and stock
splits, rules for assigning OTC ﬁrms to the diﬀerent OTC groups, determination of which years (if
any) the OTC ﬁrms ﬁled with the SEC, methods to collect ﬁnancial and accounting information
for OTC and NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms, and construction of the 4-4 groups. Our qualitative ﬁndings are
unchanged by reasonable variations on the data quality rules described here.
A. Quality Assurance of Barron’s Price Data
Data entered from Barron’s were hand checked and (if necessary) corrected by research assistants
in the United States in any case where the bid price exceeded the ask price, a bid or ask price was
not quoted in eights or the percentage diﬀerence between the bid and ask price was large.
To avoid spurious exits from Barron’s and incorrect matches of ﬁrms across weeks, we used
computer algorithms to compare and match ﬁrm name strings (as entered from Barron’s)a c r o s s
weeks and ﬂag cases where hand checking was needed due to complicated abbreviation changes. We
also looked for large changes in the bid and ask prices between Barron’s issues. Research assistants
in the United States investigated the roughly 500 largest weekly changes in split-adjusted prices.
These investigations included rechecking the Barron’s entries and the stock split information, as well
as verifying the match between ﬁrm names across issues of Barron’s. Any documented matching
errors were corrected. Otherwise, the observation was left unchanged.
B. Sample Selection
Firms dropped:
The Barron’s issue for the ﬁrst week of 1963 lists 1,752 ﬁrms. Overall, our sample selection
criteria reduces the number of OTC ﬁrms used to 1,196. The list below outlines the reasons for
dropping ﬁrms and how many ﬁrms are dropped due to each criteria. The criteria were applied in
the sequential order that follows.
(a) (37 ﬁrms) We drop preferred stocks and B stocks because these may be diﬀerentially aﬀected
by the law.
(b) (69 ﬁrms) Firms with no bid or ask price in the ﬁrst week of 1963 are dropped.
(c) (317 ﬁrms) We drop banks and insurance companies because they are regulated by multiple
agencies and the 1933, 1934, and 1964 Acts all treated one or both of these industries diﬀerently
34from other ﬁrms. Consequently, we expect that market expectations about disclosure requirements
for these groups during Period 1 were likely to be diﬀerent than for other ﬁrms. We classify a ﬁrm
as a bank or an insurance company if it appears in Barron’s in the separate sections for banks or
for insurance companies, or if it appears in Barron’s’ general lists but is assigned an SIC code 60
(Depository Institutions), 61 (Non-depository Credit Institutions), 63 (Insurance Carriers) or 64
(Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service). For ﬁrms that ﬁle with the SEC in any year between
1962 and 1967 we obtain SIC codes from the SEC Directory.F o r ﬁrms not in any of these SEC
publications, we assign SIC codes based on reading ﬁrm descriptions in the 1963 Moody’s Manuals.
(d) (5 ﬁrms) A handful of ﬁrms had names that were too similar to allow unique matching across
weeks or had information for A and B stocks that seemed mixed up across weeks making it diﬃcult
to construct a consistent time series.
(e) (5 ﬁrms) For ﬁve ﬁrms, the S&P Annual Dividend Record had incomplete or incomprehensible
information about dividends or splits in one or more years. These ﬁrms are dropped.
(f) (4 ﬁrms) A few ﬁrms that were acquired in 1962, but which still had prices listed in Barrons in
1963, were dropped.
(g) (52 ﬁrms) We drop ﬁrms that appear in neither the 1962 S&P Annual Dividend Record nor
the 1963 Moody’s Manuals (these Moody’s Manuals generally refer to ﬁscal years ending in 1962).
There is a risk that such ﬁrms do not publicly disclose earnings and dividends with resulting biases
in returns calculated without this information.
(h) (67 ﬁrms) We drop ﬁrms that have a price less than $2 in the ﬁrst Barron’s issue of 1963. Such
ﬁrms have a much lower probability of still appearing in Barron’s by the end of 1966. Dropping
these ﬁrms from the sample makes our results less sensitive to the exact approach used for dealing
with ﬁrms that exit Barron’s.
Of the OTC ﬁrm drop criteria, (b) (no price in week 1 of 1963), (c) (banks and insurance
companies), and (h) (initial price<$2) are also relevant for NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms and are applied
to these ﬁrms as well. Criterion (a) (preferred and B stocks) is not relevant for NYSE/AMEX
ﬁrms, because preferred stock are not covered in CRSP and there is no reason to expect diﬀerent
returns for the 24 NYSE/AMEX B stocks than NYSE/AMEX A or common stocks given the lack
of corporate governance reforms for NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms in the 1963-66 period.
Observations dropped:
We implement the following rules to limit the potential inﬂuence of data entry or data processing
errors. Rules (a) and (b) address possible typos in a bid or ask price. Rule (c) addresses cases
where Barron’s or we may have entered the bid and ask price for an incorrect ﬁrm for a particular
week. Rule (d) addresses extreme returns, while rule (e) addresses cases where a ﬁrm is missing
35from Barron’s for a series of weeks but then re-appears in the Barron’s listings.
(a) Bid price>Ask price: Observations where the bid price listed in Barron’s is larger than the
ask price are dropped because such cases likely result from typos by Barron’s or in our data entry.
Observations where Barron’s list only a bid or an ask price are dropped because the average of the
bid and ask (used for the calculation of returns) cannot be calculated.
(b) Bid or ask outlier: To further address likely typographical errors in the data we drop
observations where the bid price is deemed to be an outlier (typo) but the ask price is not, and
conversely. We classify the bid price to be an outlier if the absolute value of the one-week capital gain
calculated based on the bid price exceeds ﬁfty percent while the two-week capital gain calculated
based on the bid price is below ten percent (the same classiﬁcation is used for ask prices).
(c) Bid and ask outlier: To address the possibility that we or Barron’s entered the wrong line of
information for a particular ﬁrm in a particular week, we drop return observations where the week
t − 1 or week t bid and ask prices are deemed to be a mistaken entry. Such entries are deﬁned as
cases where the resulting one-week return exceeds ﬁfty percent in absolute value while the two-week
return is below ten percent.
(d) Extreme returns: We drop observations with weekly returns above 200 percent under the
presumption that most of these result from typos not caught by our above drop criteria.
(e) In cases where a ﬁrm is missing from Barron’s (or is in Barron’s but with missing price
quotes) over a number of weeks and then reappear, we do not calculate a return for the week of
the reappearance. This is done because ﬁrms may be more likely to reappear after good returns or
after bad returns. Returns prior to the reappearance and for the week of the reappearance are set
to missing. In cases where the ﬁrm only reappears after the following calendar year, we do not use
any of the data after the reappearance because ﬁrms that are not covered for a long period of time
but then reappear may be systematically diﬀerent from those that do not reappear.
For comparability, we apply rules (c) and (d) to the NYSE/AMEX dataset as well. Bid/ask
spreads are not available for listed ﬁrms, so we cannot apply rules (a)-(b) for those ﬁrms.
C. Procedures For Firms That Exit Barron’s
Appendix Table 1 summarizes our treatment of ﬁrms that exit Barron’s, change names, or are
involved in mergers. In cases of ﬁrms that move to the NYSE/AMEX, change names or are involved
in mergers, we continue the time series of returns whenever possible. In cases of liquidations, exits
from Barron’s for no apparent reason, or prolonged periods of missing information in Barron’s,w e
assign an exit return in much the same way that CRSP assigns delisting returns to ﬁrms that exit
their NYSE/AMEX data set. The objective of continuing series where feasible and calculating exit
36returns otherwise is to correct for any bias in returns that may otherwise result if ﬁrms have above
or below average returns in the week they exit Barron’s.
The exit return is assigned to the ﬁrst week where post-exit information is available and we as-
sign zero returns in the weeks between the last Barron’s price and the exit return. For comparability
we use the same timing convention when assigning delisting returns in CRSP for NYSE/AMEX
ﬁrms. Returns for weeks following the exit and prior to the week for which we have an exit return
are set to zero.
To prevent long strings of zero returns, which could bias our estimates of factor loadings in the
regressions, we do not use exit information when such information is only available for weeks more
then twenty weeks past the exit. This also insures that results are not aﬀected by censoring in the
sense that information many months out may only be available for non-representative ﬁrms that
exit the sample. For all weeks subsequent to the exit return, we assign a missing return. This is
equivalent to assuming that the missing ﬁrms’ returns for these subsequent weeks are equal to the
mean return of the remaining ﬁrms in their respective OTC group (i.e., 0-4, 2-4, 0-0, and 2-2).
More speciﬁc information on our approach in six types of situations follows. The letters below
correspond to groups in Appendix Table 1.
(a) Firms that exit Barron’s and move to the NYSE or AMEX: We use the CRSP NYSE/AMEX
ﬁles to determine which of the ﬁrms that stop being listed in Barron’s Over-the-Counter section do
so because they have moved to the NYSE or AMEX. The return for the week the ﬁrm ﬁrst appears
in CRSP is calculated using the ﬁrst CRSP price and the last Barron’s price, and information on
dividends and stock splits from S&P Annual Dividend Record. In over 94 percent of the cases the
ﬁrm appears in CRSP in the ﬁrst week after exiting from Barron’s. In a few cases there is a one,
two, or three week gap between the Barron’s exit and the ﬁrst appearance in CRSP. The return
for this week is set to zero. In a few other cases, Barron’s l i s t sp r i c e sf o raf e ww e e k sf o l l o w i n g
the appearance in CRSP. We use the CRSP prices to calculate returns for these weeks. In weeks
following the ﬁrst week of the CRSP appearance, we calculate weekly returns based on CRSP’s
information on prices, dividends, and stock splits. For simplicity, we calculate weekly returns in
CRSP based on the daily returns provided (this allows for an intra-week return on any dividends
paid but we conﬁrmed that any resulting bias from this is minuscule by alternatively calculating
returns using the prices, dividends, and splits directly).
(b) Firms that change names: Name changes are identiﬁed using the Moody’s Manuals, NSS,
and Directory of Obsolete Securities.W h e nBarron’s continues coverage of the ﬁrm under the new
name we are able continue the time series of returns for the ﬁrm. When the new ﬁrm name does
not appear in Barron’s, we assign, when possible, an exit return based on the ﬁrst post-exit price
37found in the NSS and dividend and stock split information from S&P Annual Dividend Record.
The exit return is assigned to the week of the NSS price. Weeks between the exit from Barron’s
and the NSS price are assigned a return of zero.
(c) Firms involved in mergers: Mergers and merger terms are identiﬁed using the Moody’s
Manuals, NSS,a n dDirectory of Obsolete Securities. When the acquiring company is in Barron’s
or on the NYSE/AMEX we are able to continue the time series of returns for the ﬁrm. Otherwise
we assign an exit return whenever possible, based on the ﬁrst post-exit price found in the NSS
and dividend and stock split information from S&P Annual Dividend Record. The exit return is
assigned to the week of the NSS price. Weeks between the exit from Barron’s and the NSS price
are assigned a return of zero. When merger terms are unavailable, we set the return for the merger
week to missing. In cases of acquisitions for cash, we assign an exit return and do not continue the
time series.
(d) Firms that are liquidated: Liquidations are identiﬁed using the Moody’s Manuals, Directory
of Obsolete Securities,a n dS&P Annual Dividend Record. When possible, we assign exit return
based on either information about liquidating dividends or the ﬁrst post-exit price found in the
NSS a n dd i v i d e n da n ds t o c ks p l i ti n f o r m a t i o nf r o mS&P Annual Dividend Record. The exit return
is assigned to the week of the liquidating dividend or NSS price and weeks in between the exit from
Barron’s and the NSS price are assigned a return of zero.
(e), (f) Firms that exit Barron’s for no apparent reason or for which we discontinue the return
series due to long periods of missing information in Barron’s: Appendix Table 1 splits these ﬁrms
into those that exit with a last price above two dollars and those that exit with a last price of two
dollars or less. The latter category is larger, suggesting that Barron’s tends to drop coverage of
ﬁrms with very low prices. When possible, we use the NSS as described in (d) to assign an exit
return.
Appendix Table 1 summarizes the causes of attrition from Barron’s. W i t h i ne a c ho ft h e s e
categories, it also provides counts of the securities for which the time series could be continued.
We succeeded in assigning an exit return for 78 percent of the securities where it was impossible
to continue the time series. The largest single source of attrition from the Barron’s sample is
movement to NYSE or AMEX. Over the course of the four years, 23 percent of the OTC sample
ﬁrms move to the NYSE or the AMEX. The frequency of movements to exchanges is especially
high in 1963 and 1964, slows somewhat in 1965, and slows even more in 1966. This is consistent
with the notion that, as mandatory disclosure requirements became more likely, the value of staying
unlisted declined.
To evaluate the importance of these eﬀorts to follow the stock prices of ﬁrms that exit Barron’s,
38we repeated our estimations without assigning exit returns or continuing series using information
about moves to NYSE/AMEX, name changes, and mergers. The αPd 1
0−4 estimate from the column
(5) speciﬁcation of Table IV is 0.135 with a standard error of 0.045 if exit returns are not assigned,
compared to the estimate of 0.097 with a standard error of 0.046 in Table IV from the primary
data ﬁle that includes exit returns. It is evident that the paper’s estimates of the eﬀect of the 1964
Amendments would be overstated if we had not collected exit returns.
D. Dividend Data
Our primary source for dividends and stock splits was S&P Annual Dividend Record.T h i s
publication aims to be a “record of dividend payments on virtually every American and Canadian
preferred and common stock.” The average number of ﬁrms covered in this publication during
the 1961-68 period was 10,000. There were roughly 2,000 ﬁrms on the American and New York
Stock Exchanges in these years, so approximately eighty percent of the entries were for OTC (and
Canadian) ﬁrms. Approximately 85 percent of our 1,196 OTC ﬁrms were in the 1962 S&P book.
We entered the amounts and dates of every cash, property, and liquidating dividend and stock split
for each of the OTC ﬁrms in the sample. When necessary, we used the NSS and the Directory of
Obsolete Securities to verify dividends.
As mentioned above, we dropped 52 ﬁrms that appeared in Barron’s, but failed to appear in
either the 1962 S&P Annual Dividend Record or the 1963 Moody’s Manuals. There is a risk that
such ﬁrms do not publicly disclose earnings and dividends. For the vast majority of remaining ﬁrms
not in the 1962 S&P book, we were able to use the Moody’s Manuals to verify that no dividends or
splits had taken place in 1962 or conﬁrm that the ﬁrms were included in the 1963 S&P book that
covers the dividends for the ﬁrst year of our analysis.
E. Assignment to OTC Groups
We assigned each OTC ﬁrm to one of four OTC groups based on information at the start of
1963. The 0-4 group is comprised of ﬁrms that were not ﬁling annual reports with the SEC and
exceeded the size and asset ﬂoors set forth in the 1964 Amendments. We assume that ﬁrms with
measured assets exceeding $1 million and more than 500 shareholders and ﬁrms with measured
assets exceeding $5 million but missing shareholder data qualify as exceeding the size and assets
ﬂoors. The 2-4 group includes ﬁrms that were ﬁling periodic reports with the SEC and exceeded
t h es i z ea n da s s e tﬂoors described in the previous sentence. The 2-2 group is comprised of ﬁrms
that fail to exceed the size and asset ﬂoor rules and were ﬁling periodic reports. The 0-0 ﬁrms also
fail to exceed the size and asset ﬂoor rules and were not ﬁling periodic reports with the SEC.
39The asset and stockholder characteristics as of the start of 1963 are obtained from the 1962 and
1963 Moody’s Manuals. We ascertained the identity of ﬁrms that ﬁled with the SEC from the 1963
edition of the SEC Directory. This publication lists the ﬁrms that ﬁle with the SEC in the year
ending in July 1963. Because we are interested in ﬁling status as of the start of 1963, we classify
ﬁrms that appear in the 1963 SEC Directory but (a) went to NYSE/AMEX in the ﬁrst half of 1963
and (b) did not ﬁle with the SEC according to the 1962 SEC Directory as initial non-ﬁlers (i.e. as
0-4 or 0-0 ﬁrms).
F. Determination of Compliance with Mandatory Disclosure Requirements
An essential component of the analysis is the accurate identiﬁcation of the ﬁrms that disclose
ﬁnancial information through oﬃcial SEC channels. The SEC Directory reports the identities of
each company that complies with mandated disclosure requirements. Each company’s ﬁling status
was collected annually for our sample of OTC ﬁrms. The U.S. SEC News Digest lists the exact
date that the SEC considered the complying ﬁrms in our sample to have fulﬁlled the registration
requirement in the case of the 0-4 ﬁrms and initiated the ﬁling of proxy and insider trading reports
i nt h ec a s eo ft h e2 - 4ﬁrms. We use these exact dates to implement a ﬁrm-level event study analysis
of the consequences of the initial compliance with these disclosure requirements.
G. Accounting and Industry Data
We gathered accounting information for ﬁrms in our OTC sample from the annual Moody’s
Manuals. The industry, or SIC code, of the OTC ﬁrms was determined from the Moody’s Manuals
and the SEC Directory. The COMPUSTAT electronic ﬁles are the primary source for accounting
and industry data for NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms. For NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms not covered in COMPUSTAT,
we collected this information from the Moody’s Manuals supplemented with book equity information
available from Kenneth French’s web page and used in Davis, Fama and French [2000].
H. Construction of 4-4 Groups
We construct separate 4-4 comparison groups for each of the four OTC groups. These 4-4 groups
are constructed so that the distributions of the underlying ﬁrms’ market capitalizations and book
value of equity to market value of equity are similar to these distributions in the corresponding
OTC group. The 4-4 groups that correspond to the 0-4 and 2-4 groups are constructed in the
following four steps:
1. The NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms present in CRSP at the beginning of 1963 are divided into ﬁve
market capitalization quintiles and ﬁve quintiles of book value of equity to market capitalization,
40thus creating 25 cells of ﬁrms. To be comparable to our approach to constructing the OTC groups,
these 25 cells are never refreshed to include new entrants to CRSP or changes in existing ﬁrms’
market capitalization or book value of equity to market capitalization. Consequently, the numbers
of ﬁr m si ne a c hw i l ld e c l i n eo v e rt i m ea sﬁrms go bankrupt or disappear from CRSP for other
reasons.
2. We calculate the weekly unweighted average returns of each of the 25 cells. We then determine
which of the 25 cells of the NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms each OTC ﬁr mw o u l db e l o n gt oi nt h eﬁrst week of
1963 if it were trading on the NYSE or AMEX. The ﬁrm is then matched to that cell throughout
the analysis.
3. The weekly portfolio returns of each OTC group’s matched 4-4 group in a given week are
calculated as the weighted average of the 25 NYSE/AMEX cell index returns. Each cell’s weight
is equal to the fraction of the OTC group’s ﬁrms with a non-missing return in the relevant week
that are matched to that cell.
If the 0-4 and 2-4 groups of OTC ﬁrms had been traded on the NYSE/AMEX, their mean
(median) market capitalization quintiles would have been 1.95 (2) and 2.14 (2), respectively. Their
median (mean) book to market quintiles would have been 3.14 (3) and 2.69 (3), respectively.
Quintile 1 is comprised of the ﬁrms with the smallest values of market capitalization and book
to market, respectively. The market capitalization is missing for fewer than ten of the 0-4 and
2-4 ﬁrms. We assume that these ﬁrms’ market capitalization equal their assets multiplied by the
median market capitalization to asset ratio of the ﬁrms in their group.
We use the return on the smallest NYSE/AMEX size quintile portfolio as a size-matched 4-4
group for the 0-0 and 2-2 groups. For these groups, we are unable to also match on book-to-market
equity, because market capitalization data is unavailable for most OTC ﬁrms in these groups. We
use the smallest size quintile because, as Table II demonstrated they are much smaller than the 0-4
and 2-4 ﬁrms in terms of assets and sales.
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45TABLE I
Key Dates Associated with the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 and with Research Design
1. Beginning of Period 1 (and Period 1a), January 1, 1963: Sample of OTC ﬁrms’ stock returns begins.
We assume full impact of 1964 Securities Acts Amendments on stock returns occurs in this period.
2. April 3, 1963: The SEC releases the ﬁrst part of the Special Study. It recommends imposing exchange
disclosure rules on OTC securities.
3. July 9, 1963: House subcommittee unanimously approves bill extending disclosure requirements to all
OTC ﬁrms.
4. July 30, 1963: Senate passes a bill extending disclosure rules to OTC ﬁrms with at least $1 million in
assets and 500 shareholders.
5. February, 1964: President Johnson endorses legislation and lobbies Congress to further its prospects
for passage.
6. March 19, 1964: House subcommittee passes bill and it becomes evident Congress as a whole will pass
it.
7. August 5-6, 1964: House and Senate passed the bill.
8. End of Period 1a, August 24, 1964; President Johnson signs 1964 Securities Acts Amendments into
law on August 20, 1964.
9. Beginning of Period 1b, August 24, 1964: OTC ﬁrms with at least $1 million of assets and 750
shareholders required to initially ﬁle with SEC during this period.
10. April 30, 1965 is the deadline for covered ﬁrms with ﬁscal year ends between July 1, 1964 and December
31, 1964 to initially ﬁle. Covered ﬁrms with ﬁscal year ends between January 1, 1965 and June 30,
1965 required to initially ﬁle 120 days after ﬁscal year end.
11. October 31, 1965: Last deadline for ﬁling registration statement with SEC for newly covered ﬁrms.
12. End of Period 1 (and Period 1b), November 15, 1965: Period 1 ends two weeks after October 31
deadline to allow for gradual dissemination of news about which ﬁrms ﬁled with the SEC.
13. Beginning of Period 2, November 15, 1965: Virtually no new information about the law or which ﬁrms
would comply with its requirements was revealed in this period. This period is used to assess the
validity of the Period 1 ﬁndings.
14. End of Period 2, December 31, 1966: Sample of OTC ﬁrms’ stock returns ends.
46TABLE II
Firm Characteristics by Mandatory Disclosure Groups, 1962
0-4 2-4 0-0 2-2 4-4
P a n e lA .N u m b e ro fF i r m s
Week 1, 1963 240 738 124 94 1,915
Week 52, 1966 186 610 67 63 1,668
Survival Rate 77.5 82.7 54.0 67.0 87.1
Panel B. Percent of Firms in Sample That Comply With All Four Mandatory
Disclosure Requirements as of July of Relevant Year
1963 9.2 4.7 4.0 0 100
1964 12.1 16.4 5.7 4.3 100
1965 74.6 69.7 22.6 23.4 100
1966 74.6 80.5 28.2 35.1 100
1967 80.8 82.4 37.1 54.3 100
Panel C. Firm Characteristics
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
(Med.) (Med.) (Med.) (Med.) (Med.)
Information From Barron’s/CRSP for 1963, week 1
Share Price 240 $19.8 738 $17.1 124 $9.8 94 $6.1 1,915 $25.0
($12.3) ($12.9) ($4.4) ($4.4) ($19.4)
Bid-Ask 240 11.1% 738 9.9% 124 16.7% 94 15.3% na na
Spread (%) (10.0%) (9.1%) (17.1%) (14.9%) na
Information From Moody’s/COMPUSTAT for 1962
# Shareholders 232 2,946 695 4,757 13 506 14 577 na na
(1,861) (2,300) (389) (435) na
Assets 240 $44.5 738 $33.4 100 $2.7 89 $3.0 1,906 $207.9
($12.2) ($14.7) ($1.3) ($2.1) ($41.7)
Market 237 $44.6 734 $26.5 23 $4.4 39 $2.5 1,915 $189.1
Capitalization ($9.1) ($10.4) ($1.9) ($2.3) ($28.5)
Book Value 230 $25.5 727 $15.3 19 $3.5 27 $2.1 1,904 $134.1
of Equity ($8.0) ($7.4) ($1.3) ($1.6) ($28.0)
Net Income 238 $2.7 731 $1.6 99 $0.1 89 $0.2 1,903 $11.5
($0.7) ($0.8) ($0.1) ($0.2) ($1.9)
Sales 223 $45.9 718 $32.3 99 $3.3 86 $4.6 1,881 $187.7
($14.6) ($16.3) ($2.0) ($2.8) ($48.0)
Information From S&P Security Owners’ Stock Guide
% Held by 120 4.04% 490 4.42% 8 2.52% 14 5.79% na na
Institutions (2.19%) (2.69%) (1.33%) (3.56%) na
Note: All ﬁrms tabulated in the OTC and NYSE/AMEX groups are present in their respective samples as
of the ﬁrst week of 1963. NYSE/AMEX ﬁrms tabulated exclude ﬁrms that enter from the Barron’s sample
during the 63-66 period. All dollar ﬁgures are in millions, except per share data. Means and medians are
calculated using available observations.
47TABLE III
F i r mL e v e lA n a l y s i so fS E CR e g i s t r a t i o n
0 - 4—4 - 4 2 - 4—4 - 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(10-Week Period From 0.358 0.350 0.344 0.369 0.350 0.312
Filing To Registration) (0.177) (0.173) (0.162) (0.103) (0.097) (0.092)
Constant 0.002 0.082 0.060 -0.151 -0.040 -0.013
(0.099) (0.082) (0.069) (0.090) (0.071) (0.051)
R-Squared 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.003
Factor Model None 4 Factors 4 Factors None 4 Factors 4 Factors
Firms 145 145 215 417 417 693
Observations (Firm-Weeks) 8,845 8,845 12,824 25,857 25,857 42,277
Full Sample No No Yes No No Yes
Note: The sample in columns 1 and 4 includes all ﬁrms that belong to either group 0-4 or group 2-4 and for
which returns during the period are available. Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 limit the sample to ﬁrms that register
with the SEC before the end of period 1. The indicator variable 1(Period Between Filing and Registration)
equals 1 between the 8 weeks before registration and the 1 week after registration (both inclusive). Columns
1, 2, 4, and 5 include a constant terms as the only other explanatory variable. Columns 3 and 6 also includes
the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors. Clustered standard errors, allowing for correlation
across ﬁrms within weeks, are in parentheses.
48TABLE IV
Average Abnormal Excess Return;
Period 1, January 1963 — November 15, 1965
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0-4 (0-4)-(4-4)
αPd 1
0−4 (%) 0.378 0.187 0.053 0.078 0.097 0.129 0.083 0.149
(0.077) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047)
R-squared — 0.639 — 0.028 0.191 0.195 0.213 0.160
2-4 (2-4)-(4-4)
αPd 1
2−4 (%) 0.296 0.095 -0.010 0.013 0.024 0.057 0.035 0.056
(0.080) (0.049) (0.045) (0.043) (0.040) (0.043) (0.048) (0.039)
R-squared — 0.667 — 0.026 0.133 0.120 0.166 0.079
0-0 (0-0)-(4-4)
αPd 1
0−0 (%) 0.257 0.063 -0.095 -0.075 -0.095 -0.109 -0.116 0.000
(0.110) (0.092) (0.096) (0.095) (0.098) (0.117) (0.135) (0.105)
R-squared — 0.326 — 0.004 0.056 0.040 0.056 0.059
2-2 (2-2)-(4-4)
αPd 1
2−2 (%) 0.214 0.033 -0.138 -0.131 -0.125 -0.071 -0.110 -0.021
(0.130) (0.115) (0.106) (0.107) (0.114) (0.116) (0.127) (0.112)
R-squared — 0.296 — 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.038 0.024
Test of equal α, p-value
αPd 1
0−4 = αPd 1
2−4 0.014 0.015 0.064 0.054 0.053 0.046 0.284 0.020
αPd 1
0−4 = αPd 1
0−0 0.149 0.167 0.100 0.087 0.049 0.051 0.146 0.160
αPd 1
0−4 = αPd 1
2−2 0.097 0.128 0.054 0.032 0.030 0.062 0.107 0.100
Factor Model None 4F None CAPM 4F 4F 4F 4F
Buy and Hold No No No No No Yes Yes No
Value Weighted No No No No No No Yes No
Industry Matched No No No No No No No Yes
Note: The entries in columns 1 and 2 are the parameter estimates and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors (in parentheses) on the constant from the estimation of versions of equation (2). Columns 3-8 are
based on estimates of equation (3). Bold-face panel headings denote groups and the speciﬁcation details are
at the bottom of the table. The sample size is 148 weeks, but it is based on 149 calendar weeks. See footnote
31 for details. “CAPM” indicates that the regression controls for the return on the market. “4F” indicates
controls for the market, size, book-to-market and momentum factors. Details on these factors, as well as our
methodology for “buy and hold” returns, value weighting, and adjusting for industry returns are provided
in the text.
49TABLE V
Average Abnormal Excess Return
January 1963 — August 24, 1964 (Period 1a) and
August 24, 1964 — November 15, 1965 (Period 1b)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0-4 (0-4)-(4-4)
αPd 1a
0−4 (%) 0.299 0.223 0.066 0.100 0.115 0.141 0.122 0.165
(0.095) (0.076) (0.064) (0.065) (0.068) (0.070) (0.074) (0.068)
R-squared — 0.521 — 0.035 0.132 0.153 0.186 0.172
0-4 (0-4)-(4-4)
αPd 1b
0−4 (%) 0.483 0.206 0.036 0.053 0.106 0.133 0.039 0.174
(0.127) (0.067) (0.072) (0.071) (0.065) (0.067) (0.057) (0.069)
R-squared — 0.778 — 0.021 0.328 0.281 0.252 0.194
2-4 (2-4)-(4-4)
αPd 1a
2−4 (%) 0.230 0.129 0.030 0.052 0.052 0.086 0.141 0.088
(0.102) (0.081) (0.061) (0.059) (0.066) (0.067) (0.070) (0.065)
R-squared — 0.583 — 0.016 0.097 0.089 0.140 0.127
2-4 (2-4)-(4-4)
αPd 1b
2−4 (%) 0.381 0.112 -0.062 -0.039 0.026 0.058 -0.068 0.061
(0.128) (0.058) (0.065) (0.063) (0.053) (0.060) (0.064) (0.049)
R-squared — 0.787 — 0.046 0.265 0.229 0.282 0.112
Test of equal α, p-value
αPd 1a
0−4 = αPd 1a
2−4 0.133 0.070 0.426 0.278 0.214 0.258 0.773 0.149
αPd 1b
0−4 = αPd 1b
2−4 0.045 0.091 0.057 0.079 0.153 0.173 0.053 0.060
Factor Model None 4F None CAPM 4F 4F 4F 4F
Buy and Hold No No No No No Yes Yes No
Value Weighted No No No No No No Yes No
Industry Matched No No No No No No No Yes
Note: The entries in columns 1 and 2 are the parameter estimates and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors (in parentheses) on the constant from the estimation of versions of equation (2). Columns 3-8 are
based on estimates of equation (3). Bold-face panel headings denote groups and the speciﬁcation details are
at the bottom of the table. The sample size is 85 weeks for Period 1a and 64 weeks for Period 1b. “CAPM”
indicates that the regression controls for the return on the market. “4F” indicates controls for the market,
size, book-to-market, and momentum factors. Details on these factors, as well as our methodology for “buy
and hold” returns, value weighting, and adjusting for industry returns are provided in the text.
50TABLE VI
Average Abnormal Excess Return
Period 2, November 15, 1965 through end of 1966
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0-4 (0-4)-(4-4)
αPd 2
0−4 (%) -0.031 0.076 -0.097 -0.149 -0.022 -0.020 -0.105 0.018
(0.231) (0.083) (0.111) (0.090) (0.077) (0.115) (0.093) (0.095)
R-Squared — 0.912 — 0.373 0.669 0.586 0.666 0.395
2-4 (2-4)-(4-4)
αPd 2
2−4 (%) -0.014 0.060 -0.075 -0.127 -0.035 0.007 -0.034 -0.022
(0.235) (0.073) (0.106) (0.082) (0.074) (0.092) (0.088) (0.069)
R-Squared — 0.938 — 0.409 0.627 0.602 0.765 0.416
0-0 (0-0)-(4-4)
αPd 2
0−0 (%) 0.276 0.303 0.150 0.111 0.172 0.169 0.336 0.215
(0.318) (0.212) (0.206) (0.213) (0.235) (0.261) (0.317) (0.235)
R-Squared — 0.634 — 0.059 0.085 0.082 0.131 0.115
2-2 (2-2)-(4-4)
αPd 2
2−2 (%) 0.092 0.033 -0.035 -0.062 -0.098 -0.080 -0.041 -0.054
(0.334) (0.160) (0.180) (0.186) (0.166) (0.199) (0.237) (0.150)
R-Squared — 0.748 — 0.038 0.062 0.040 0.166 0.201
Test of equal α, p-value
αPd 2
0−4 = αPd 2
2−4 0.765 0.801 0.703 0.708 0.841 0.738 0.404 0.619
αPd 2
0−4 = αPd 2
0−0 0.117 0.281 0.213 0.214 0.339 0.432 0.154 0.395
αPd 2
0−4 = αPd 2
2−2 0.532 0.803 0.751 0.668 0.680 0.787 0.797 0.697
Factor Model None 4F None CAPM 4F 4F 4F 4F
Buy and Hold No No No No No Yes Yes No
Value Weighted No No No No No No Yes No
Industry Matched No No No No No No No Yes
Note: The entries in columns 1 and 2 are the parameter estimates and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors (in parentheses) on the constant from the estimation of versions of equation (2). Columns 3-8 are
based on estimates of equation (3). Bold-face panel headings denote groups and the speciﬁcation details are
at the bottom of the table. The sample size is 58 weeks. “CAPM” indicates that the regression controls
for the return on the market. “4F” indicates controls for the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum
factors. Details on these factors, as well as our methodology for “buy and hold” returns, value weighting,
and adjusting for industry returns are provided in the text.
51TABLE VII
Change in Operating Performance, 1962-1966
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Net Income Growth Sales Growth
Sample Survivors Assigned Survivors Assigned
0-4 Indicator 0.038 0.030 1.091 0.835
(0.015) (0.012) (0.149) (0.121)
2-4 Indicator 0.013 0.012 0.171 0.161
(0.009) (0.008) (0.091) (0.077)
ln(Assets 1962) -0.002 -0.001 -0.104 -0.089
(0.003) (0.002) (0.025) (0.022)
R2 0.020 0.019 0.063 0.049
N 2,408 2,799 2,331 2,741
Notes: “Net Income Growth” is deﬁned as (Net Income in 1966 - Net Income in 1962)/Market Capitalization
in 1962. “Sales Growth” is deﬁned as (Sales in 1966 - Sales in 1962)/Sales in 1962. Sample is based on 0-4,
2-4, and 4-4 ﬁrms as of January 1963. The excluded category is 4-4 ﬁrms. In columns 1 and 3, the sample
is restricted to those ﬁrms for which comparable 1966 information was available. In columns 2 and 4, ﬁrms
with missing growth information were assigned the 10th or 50th percentile of ﬁrms in its group (see text
for further details). The top and bottom one percent of observations in terms of the dependent variable are
dropped. Regressions include 1-digit SIC dummies. The sample means of the dependent variable in columns
1-4 are 0.093, 0.091, 0.863, and 0.857, respectively.
52Appendix 1:
Treatment Of Firm Changes For OTC Firms
Jan 63 Jan 64 Jan 65 Jan 66 Dec 66
Sample size 1196 1129 1053 986 941
(a) Move to NYSE/AMEX 87 83 65 39
C o n t i n u e d 8 78 36 53 9
(b) Name change 9 15 10 7
Continued 6 10 6 6
Not continued (ER assigned/not assigned) 3 (1/2) 5 (3/2) 4 (3/1) 1 (0/1)
( c ) M e r g e r 3 03 83 62 5
Continued (merger week return ass./not ass.) 23 (20/3) 28 (20/8) 24 (19/5) 18 (16/2)
Not continued (merger week return ass./not ass.) 7 (4/3) 10 (8/2) 12 (9/3) 7 (6/1)
(d) Liquidations 5 5 5 5
Not continued (ER assigned/not assigned) 5 (3/2) 5 (1/4) 5 (3/2) 5 (3/2)
(e) Exit from Barron’s,l a s tp r i c e > $2 29 14 14 13
Not continued (ER assigned/not assigned) 29 (28/1) 14 (13/1) 14 (10/4) 13 (12/1)
( f )E x i tf r o mBarron’s,l a s tp r i c e ≤ $2 39 22 16 17
Not continued (ER assigned/not assigned) 39 (31/8) 22 (19/3) 16 (13/3) 17 (11/6)
Total exits/changes 198 177 138 106
Total series continued 116 121 95 63
Note: “ER” stands for “exit return”. Among the ﬁrms with discontinued time series of returns, “ER as-
signed”/“not assigned” refers to ﬁrms for which it was possible/impossible to assign exit returns within 20
weeks of the last Barron’s price. Overall, we succeeded in assigning an exit return for 78 percent of the 233
ﬁrms where the time series of returns was not continued. The number of observations at the beginning of the
following year does not exactly equal the number of observations at the beginning of the current year, minus
the number of exits/changes, plus the number of series that are continued. This is because an exit return
may only be assigned in the following calendar year. Furthermore, series that are continued may again be
subject to one of the changes in (a)-(f). Such changes are not included in the above counts.
53Appendix II:
Factor Loadings by Group and Period
P d 1P d 2P d 1P d 2P d 1P d 2P d 1P d 2
OTC Groups
0-4 2-4 0-0 2-2
Market Factor Beta 0.701 0.866 0.750 0.837 0.588 0.815 0.720 0.783
(0.056) (0.061) (0.057) (0.057) (0.106) (0.147) (0.131) (0.109)
Size Factor Beta 0.651 0.904 0.725 0.892 0.868 1.209 0.977 1.294
(0.117) (0.133) (0.117) (0.095) (0.186) (0.259) (0.204) (0.193)
Book/Market Factor Beta 0.014 0.236 0.070 0.282 0.037 0.345 0.205 0.565
(0.085) (0.059) (0.081) (0.700) (0.146) (0.282) (0.177) (0.321)
Momentum Factor Beta 0.054 -0.248 -0.011 -0.170 0.159 -0.187 -0.200 -0.028
(0.074) (0.084) (0.085) (0.060) (0.139) (0.198) (0.175) (0.170)
R2 0.639 0.912 0.667 0.938 0.326 0.634 0.296 0.748
NYSE/AMEX Comparison Groups
For 0-4 For 2-4 For 0-0 and 2-2
Market Factor Beta 0.840 0.982 0.868 0.992 0.747 0.944
(0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.070) (0.062)
Size Factor Beta 0.969 1.087 0.985 1.089 1.039 1.357
(0.062) (0.079) (0.061) (0.082) (0.107) (0.141)
Book/Market Factor Beta 0.250 0.268 0.214 0.245 0.245 0.341
(0.062) (0.060) (0.063) (0.058) (0.104) (0.095)
Momentum Factor Beta -0.104 -0.067 -0.115 -0.063 -0.208 -0.123
(0.070) (0.053) (0.068) (0.052) (0.126) (0.098)
R2 0.875 0.974 0.886 0.974 0.680 0.925
Note: The entries are the factor loadings (betas) on the four factors in the estimation of equation (2).
Heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
54Cumulative Abnormal Average Excess Returns (Over Group 4-4)
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Figure I. Cumulative Abnormal Excess Returns Near SEC Registration
55Cumulative Average Returns
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Figure IIa. Cumulative Returns By Group, OTC ﬁrms, 1963-1966
Cumulative Average Returns
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Figure IIb. Cumulative Returns By Group, NYSE/AMEX Comparison Groups, 1963-1966
56Cumulative Average Returns
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Figure IIIa. Cumulative Returns Of OTC Group 0-4 And Its NYSE/AMEX Comparison Group, 1963-1966
Cumulative Average Returns
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Figure IIIb. Cumulative Returns Of OTC Group 2-4 And Its NYSE/AMEX Comparison Group, 1963-1966
Note: Vertical lines in Figures 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b are at the ends of Period 1a and Period 1b. See
text for further details.
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